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Chapter I. Discussion 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new method for obtaining 
decidability results in non-classical logics. This method, to be called the 
reduction method, has a wide range of applications in modal, tense and 
intuitionistic systems and theories. This new method has a much wider 
range of applications than any of the currently employed methods of ob- 
taining decidability results for non-classical systems (see Section 3). The 
reduction method is based on a result of Rabin [26], concerning the 
decidability of the monadic second-order theory (notation: S~S) of R0 
successor functions (details are given below). 
The reduction method for obtaining decidability is supplemented by
the author's interpretation method for obtaining undecidability results 
in non-classical logics (also based on ideas of Rabin-Scott,  see [25]). For 
many logics dnd theories, these two methods are complementary to one 
another, in the sense that in practice, for a given theory, one of the meth- 
ods would apply. See Section 4 below and [ 10-12]. 
I am indebted to Rabin's insight for suggesting that his results in [26] 
might have applications in non-classical logics. 
I am grateful to the referee for many helpful remarks. An earlier ver- 
sion of this paper appeared as a technical report, Jerusalem, March 1969. 
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2. The method, intuitive description 
From the technical point of view, a formula of classical logic expresses 
a property of classical structures. A formula of modal, tense or intuition- 
istic logics expresses a property of Kripke structures, which are families 
of classical structures. It may happen that a reduction class lor a non- 
classical system T is also "definable" in classi,:al logic by a theory ~(T), 
using possibly richer and stronger languages. In this case, if O(T) is decid- 
able, so is T. 
The main tool for obtaining the decidability of the corresponding O(T), 
is the decidability of the theory $6oS (of [261, see below). S~S was 
proved decidable by Rabin, and he used it to obtain many decidability 
results of classical theories. 
Suppose we are given a non-classical theory T. For example, T can be 
the intuitionistic theory of abelian groups with the axioms x = y v x ~: y 
and (Vx)(mx = O) (m fixed). What steps do we take to obtain its decid- 
ability (if possible). Our first step is to find a "suitable" semanti :s for the 
theory T (i.e. a reduction class, "suitable" in the sense of what follows). 
Our second step is to find a "suitable" theory O(T) of classical ogic (in 
practice we usually take O(T) = StoS) that can "define" or express the 
semantics ofT.  Now given a sentence A of the language ofT ,  we can ex- 
press in the language of O(T), the statement A* o f  O(T) that says: 
"A is true in all models of the s~ mantics o fT . "  
Thus we clearly have 
®(T} ~ A* iff T I-- A 
In practice we find that in many cases general theorems can be formu- 
lated. The reason for this is that one can associate with many classes of 
possible axiorfis, certain other corresponding families of semantic ondi- 
tions (and therefore corresponding reduction classes) that are readily seen 
to be expressible in SwS. 
In this connection, it is of value to remark how the interpretation 
method works (for obtaining undecidability). The method is actually 
similar to the reduction method. Again, for a given theory T, find a 
"suitable" semantics (or reduction class) and using this semanti:s, inter- 
pr.~t faithfully in T, the classically undecidable theory RS of a reflexive 
and symmetric binary relation. Thus any statement A of RS can be trans- 
lated into a statement A # of T with 
T b-.4 e iff RS b-A. 
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Again, we can state general sufficient conditions for undecidability (see 
[ 10, 12], for some examples and Section 4 below). As we mentioned 
before, in practice: for a given T, one of the sufficient conditions for un- 
decidability, or the reduction method for decidability would apply. For 
example, if we refer back to the theory T mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, we find that it is 6ecidable if and only if th,~ fixed number 
m is a product of pairwise different prime numbers (see [ 16]). 
3. Significance 
There are two current rriethods for obtaining decidability for non- 
classical systems. One is semantic (or algebraic) which applies to propo- 
sitional systems only, and uses the finite mooel property; and one is syn- 
tactical, through the examination of the proof procedures or the elimina- 
tion of quantifiers. 
(a) For propositional calculi, one may use the finite model property 
(f.m.p.) to obtain decidability. This works as follows: Given a logic L, 
we consider the algebraic (essentially the Lindebaum algebra) or a Kripke 
semantics for L. t L is said to have the f.m.p, with respect o that 
(algebra) semantics iff for any wff A, if L ~A then there exists a finite 
(algebra) semantic model and an assignment that validates all the axioms 
and rules of L but does not validate A. Now the following theorem of 
Harrop is used (we say L has f.m.p., meaning w.r.t, some semantics). 
Theorem 3.1 (Harrop). / f  L is finitely axiomatizable and has the f m.p. 
then it is decidable. 
We quote some results for illustration. 
Theorem 3.2 (McKay [ 23 ]). Every extension of  the intuitionistic propo- 
sitional calculus with axioms without dis~unction has the f.m.p, and is 
therefore decidable if finitely axiomatizable. 
Theorem 3.3 (Bull [ 1 ]). Every normal extension of  the model system 
$4.3 has the f.m.p, and is therefore decidable if finitely axiomatizable. 
I Actually, any Momague type semantics or Normal Dian semantics, see [15]. 
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These are just two examples. The method has been refined and exten- 
sively applied by several authors (see [91 far a survey). The method how- 
ever, has a limitation: as can be seen from the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.4 (Gabbay [ 8 ] ). There exists a finitely axiomt.tizable, decid- 
able normal extension o f  the modal ogic T (of  yon Wright) that does not 
have the fm.p.  
The decidability of this system is proved using the reduction method. 
For a survey concerning lack of f.m.p, and the results used in obtaining 
the above theorem see [ 13]. (Makinson was first to introduce a system 
extending T that lacks the f.m.p.) 
(b) The syntactical "method" for obtaining decidability, has been em- 
ployed in many cases. We mention two examples. 
Theorem 3.5 (Kripke [24]). The implicational part (fragm~t~t) R l o f  
relevant logic is decidable. 
Theorem 3.6 (Lifshits). The inttdtionistic theory o f  decidabh" equaliO, 
(L e., with x = y v x :/: y) is decidable. 
Later, Theorem 3.5 was obtained by Meyer using f.m.p, and 
Theorem 3.6 by Gabbay using the reduction method. 
Although technically we cannot say that the reduction method is 
stronger or weaker than the syntactical method, in practice its applica- 
tions are much more extensive. It is also semantic in nature, and there- 
fore much more easy to apply (maybe you don't feel that way!L 
It should be mentioned that undecidable modal and intuition~stic prop- 
ositional calculi are known. Jankov gave intermediate logics that are not 
decidable (though also not necessarily finitely axiomatizable) and lsard 
gave a finitely axiomatizable (though not normal) extension of tile modal 
logic K that is not decidable. The interesting open problem is to find an 
undecidable finitely axiomatizable intermediate logic. 
4. Sample results 
In this section we survey some decidability and so:he related tmdecid- 
ability results obtained in this and other papers. This paper shall treat 
mainly propositional, modal and intuitionistic systems. 
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Theorem 4.1. (a) The intuitionistic theory o f  pule equality is undecidable; 
(b) The intuitionistic theory o f  pure decidable quality is decidable. 
(a) was first proven by Smorynski (see Theorem 4. t0) and (b), follow- 
ing simply f,om the reduction method, by Lifshits [ 111. 
Theorem 4.2 (Gabbay [ 11 ]). Let CLC be the extension o f  the intuition- 
istic (L e., lleyting's) predicate cab'uhts with the schemas: 
(i) (A ~ B) v (B ~ A) 
(ii) (¥x) (A v B(x)) -* (A v (¥x) B(x)), x not free in A. 
Then the pure theory o f  one monadic predicate in CLC is decidable, 
while t'~at o f  two monadic predicates is not decidable. 
Theorem 4,3 (Gabbay). (a) Let G be the intuitionistic :heory o f  abelian 
groups with decidable quality. That is, the language of  G contains +, 0, 
= and the axioms are (in Heyting's predicate calculus): 
(i) x+y = y+ ~¢; 
( i i )x+0=x;  
(iii) (x + y)  + z = x + (y+z) ;  
(iv) (Vx)(3y) (x+y = 0); 
(v) Axioms for decidable quality. 
Then G is undecidable [ 10]. 
(b) Let G m be the extension of  G with the following axiom 
(Vx)(mx = 0). 
Then G m Js decidable if/' m is' the product o f  pairwise different prime 
numbers [ 161. 
(c) Suppose we add to G m the axiom 
A [(3y)(x = ny) v 3 (~y) (x  = ny)] 
i~n<m 
77ten this new theory is decidable [ 16]. 
Theorem 4.4 (Gabbay). (a) The intuitionistic theory o f  one unary lunc- 
tion with decidable quality is undecidable [10]. 
(b) However, i f  we ~dd the following two axioms we get a decidable 
theory [ I I ], m f ixed (see Chapter 6): 
(i) (Vx)(3y 1 .... , Ym) (A l<i<m X = f(Y i ) ) ,  
(ii) (VX, Y0 .... , Ym) (A 0< i< m x = f (Y i )  -~ V isj Yi = )~). 
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Example 4.5 (Gabbay). ~/arious tatability propositional systems arise in 
connection with various attempts to formalize the phenomenon that in 
some possible worlds certain statements may not be "statable" or 
"defined". The (natural) systems of this kind that are studied in the 
literature are all decidable, see [ 7]. (In fact, the completeness proofs of 
[7] were given in such a way as to make it clear that the semantics i ex- 
pressible in SwS.) 
Example 4.6 (Gabbay, [ 17]). Pure theories of equality in modal logics 
were investigated in [ 17] for several philosophically well motivated 
modal logics, especially those introduced by F~bllesdal. We mentien here 
one result which we feel is a little surprising. 
Consider Kripke models with possible worlds with varying domains 
(i.e., without any special requirement on the domains of the possible 
worlds). 2 i fA (x l ,  ... ' xn ) is a wff with all free variables indicated and a i 
are elements of the domain of world t, then understand DA(a 1 ..... a n) as 
true at t i f f  for all worlds s, possibly relative to t, (i.e., such that t R s 
holds) the following two conditions hold: 
(i) all a I . . . . .  a n are elements of the domain o fs  (i.e. a i E Us);  
(ii) A(a  I . . . . .  a n) holds in s. 
Consider the pure theory of eqt:ality of this semantics with = consider- 
ed as actual i dent i ty .  Let F=C be the system arising from the above se- 
mantics for a general relation R and let F4=C be the system arising from 
the semantics with R t rans i t ive .  Then F=C is not  decidable and F4=C is 
decidable. This is the first case that the condition (or axiom correspond- 
ing to) transitivity make:J; a difference. It is worthwhile stating the 
axioms for these systems. 
(a) Axiom schemas for the undecidable F=C. 
(1) Axioms for classical equality, 
(2) ~- A(x  I . . . . .  x,~) 
~- A D(X i=Xi ) - * [~. t (X  1 . . . .  ,Xn)  
l~i<~n 
where x i are all tne free variables of A, 
(3) A(. . . ,x .... )~[ ] (x=x) ,  
(4) [] (A ~ B) -~ (D A ~ [] B), 
(5) c] (x =x)  ^  r-1 (y =y)  ^  x : /=y  ~ [] (xq :y ) .  
2 Recall that the usoal requirement is that tR s implies U t ~ U s, where R is the accessibility rela- 
tion and U t is the do~nain of the world t. 
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(b) The decidable system F4=¢; is obtained by adding to F---C the 
axiom schema: 
(6) [] A ~ I:I[]A 
Example 4.7. The system of strong negation presented by Nelson (see 
[301) can easily be seen to be decidable (by the reduction method). (By 
the way, it lacks the f.m.p.) The same is true for the system of Lopez- 
Escobar [221. 
Example 4.8. Various intermediate logics and various modal ogics proved 
decidable in this paper and in [ 18]. 
Example 4.9. [~.efore we go on to the next chapter, we would like to 
quote an interesting sufficient cor:dition for undecidability of intuition- 
istic theories. 
Suppose T is a set of axioms in the language of the predicate calculus. 
T can give rise to a classical theory T c , if the underlying logic is taken to 
be classical, or to an intuitionistic theory T l, if the underlying logic is 
taken to be intuition~stic. The tbllowing is a sufficient condition for the 
undecidability of 1 ! . 
Theorem 4.10 (Gabbay [12]). Let T be a set o f  axioms in a language 
with equality (=) for an intuitionistic theory T i, then T I is undec,:dable 
i f  the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) T c has a (classical) model with at least two elements; 
(ii) The class o f  models o fT  c is closed under direct sums, (with 
operations and relations defined pointwise in the direct sum). 
(iii) T contains only the usual axioms for equality, i.e., 
X =X,  X =y~ )' =X,  
X =y^ y = Z ~ X =Z, 
X = y "~ A(x)  -* A(y) .  
(iv) All the other axioms have the form 
(a) Vx I , . . . ,x  n (AA i -* VBj), or 
(b) (any string of  quantifiers) ^VGij , 
where A i, Bj, Gii are atomic. 
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Corollary 4.11 (Gabbay). The following intuitionistic theories are un- 
decidable: 
(i) abelian groups; 
(ii) divisible abelian groups; 
(iii) one unary function; 
(iv) equality; 
(v) abelian grottp with the additional axiom (¥x) (mx = 0), m fixed, 
etc. 
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Chapter 2. Some completeness theorems 
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1. Introduction 
As our main concern in this paper is the application of the reduction 
methGd to modal and intuitioni~tic propositional calculi, it would be of 
value to devote this chapter to some completeness results, that we can 
use later on. For more detaiis and more results ee :he unpublished [21 ]. 
In Chapter 3 we shall give a detailed strategy for obtaining decidability 
results in modal propositional calculi, and in Chapter 4 we shall use this 
strategy together with the completeness results of this chapter and obtain 
the decidability of several families of modal syste ms. 
2. Basic modal ogics 
The weakest possible modal system to which we can expect o apply 
our method is the system C-2 of Lemmon [20]. The reader familiar with 
[ 15] will notice that this is the weakest possible logic that can be charac- 
terized by a Kripke semantics with point to point accessibility relation, 
which we may hope to express in Sws. (Weaker systems would require 
point to set relations.) 
C-2 contains, besides the classical connectives, the modal operator 
DA (<>A is definable as ~D~A). The axioms and rules of C-2 are the 
follcwing schemas: 
(i) 13(A ~B)  ~ (I-IA -+ E.B) 
(ii) l- A ~, B 
~-DA-+DB 
(iii) All theorems and rules of the classical propositional calculus. 
It is well known that C-2 is complete for the class of all Kripke models 
of the form (N, S, R, O, D), where S is a countable set of possible worlds, 
N c_ S is the set of normal worlds R c_ S × S is the accessibility relation, 
O ~ S is the actual world arid for each t ~ S and each propositional vari- 
able q, D(t, q) ~ {0, 1} is a truth value. It is sometimes convenient to 
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write (N, S, R, O, Dr), t ~ S, with D t = Xq D(t, q), and to regard D t as 
the classical model associated with the world t. 
If [A It denotes the truth value of a wf fA at the world t0 then the 
truth table for [] is 
[DA]t = 1 iff tCNand iA]s= 1 for alls such that e~' .  
C-2 is complete tbr this semantics in the sense that C-2 ~ A iff 
IA] 0 = I in all models (N, S, R, O, D);A being an arbitrary wff. 
Table 1 gives some of the extensions of C-2 considered in the literature. 
The system on the left is complete for the class of all models satisfying 
the conditions on the right. A more complete table shall be given later on. 
Table t 
o 
System Condition 
(1) K = C-2 + rule N = S 
~-A~-DA 
(2) T = K + axiom schema N = S, R reflexive 
OA -+ A 
(3) S4 = T + axiom schema N = S, R reflexive and transitive 
DA~ E]DA 
(4) B = K + axiom schema N --- S, R symmetric 
A"DOA 
(5) $5 = $4 + axiom schema N = S, R = S x S 
A~CoA 
Suppose we are given a logic L _ C-,. and we suspect hat L is com- 
plete for the class of all models (N, S, R, O, D) fulfilIing a certain condi- 
tion F. There is a simple way (due to Makinson-Scott)  of  proving com- 
pleteness that works for many normal logics L (L is normal if for all wft~ 
A, L ~A implies L I - -DA)We let S be the set of all L~complete and con- 
sistent theories and define R c S X S and N c S by: 
(i) x ~ N iff for some wf fA,  [] A ~ x, 
(ii) x R y iff for all A, if [] A ~ x then A a y. 
One is expectt d now to use the axioms and theorems of L and show that 
(N, S, R) fulfills the (required) condition F. To turn this imo a model 
(define D) let 
[q]x = 1 iff q E x 
for x ~ S and q atomic. 
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Now using Lemma 2.1 below one can show that for any A 
[A]x = I iff A~x.  
This shows that any L-consistent theory has a model. Observe that S 
may not be countable, but this can be overcome in all cases, as we shall 
show later in this chapter. Let us now state the lemma. 
[,emma 2.1. Let x E N and assume that for some wf f  A, ~H A ~ x. Then 
for some y ~ S we have that ~A E y and x R y. 
We have mentioned these details for the purpose of making it easy for 
us to give below several completeness proofs for several families of logi- 
cal systems. We shall present hree groups of axiom schemas, H l -H3,  
(depending on parameters m, n, r, s ~ w) which added to K yield three 
logical systems H ! K-H3K (depending on the parameters). We then give 
three conditions h I -h3  on (N, S, R) (again depending on the parameters) 
such that HjK is complete for the class of all models (N, S, R, O, D) ful- 
filling N = S and the corresponding condition hj (j = i, 2, 3, the param- 
eters are fixed throughout). 
Let L be any of the above three logics (with the parameiers m, n, r, s 
fixed). Let h be the corresponding condition. It follows from the discus- 
sion above that in order to prove completeness it is sufficient o show 
that for the model (N, S, R, D) of the discussion above (i.e., S = set of 
all L-complete theories, etc.) the condition h holds. We must also show 
that Lemma 2.1 holds, but this is standard and always holds. 
3. Some special systems 
The system Hjk ( / -  !, 2, 3) depends on the fixed parameters m, n, r, 
s (which are natural numbers t> 0) and is obtained by adding the axiom 
schema Hj to modal K. 
Axiom 111. Hm OnA "* [73rOSA. 
Axiom H2. l ima 1 ~; i<kOnAi ~ Gr i--1 s A1 ¢i<k Ai, k a natural number. 
This is a group o f  axioms, one for each k. 
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Axiom H3. <)mff]nA ~ I-lr C~sA. 
Remember that m, n, r, s are fixed throughout. Now the respective 
semantical conditions h/" (] = 1, 2, 3) are: 
hi.  (Vx, u) [x Rru ~ (3v) (x R m o ^  (Vz) (o Rn z "" tt RSz)) ] ; 
h2. (¥x) (3u ,  v) [xRmu^xRrv^ (Vz, z ' ) (uR"z^ vRSz '~  z = z')]; 
h3. (Vx, u, o) [x R m u ^  x Rro ~ (3 z) (u R n z ^  o RSz) ]. 
Turning to the proof of completeness, let L be any of these logics and 
h the corresponding condition. We shall show that L is complete for the 
class of all Kripke models in which N = S and h holds. Let S be the class 
of all L-consistent and complete theories. Define N, R as in Section 2. 
Clearly N = S holds because D(A --~ A) is provable. We want to show that 
h holds. 
Lemma hi .  For L = H IK, (S, R)fu l f i l l s  condit ion h l. 
Proof. Let x, u ~ S be such that x Rru. 
We are looking for a theory v such that x R m v ^  (qz) (v R"z  ~ u R~z). 
We claim that the following theory o 0 is L-consistent, 
v o =(A IDmA ~ x} U [D"B lnSB ~ u}. 
For otherwise for some A i, B! (let A = AA i , B = ABi) we have: 
L I--A -* ~DnB,  l-'lmA ~- x, E]SB E u.  
Therefore 
hence 
L ~ fflmA --> I~mo n ~B 
rqm ©n ~ B E x . 
Now since DSB ~ u, we get that O r [3~B ~ x and so by H 1, O r" DnB ~. x, 
which is a contradirtion. 
Having found v 0 consistent, we can extend it to a complete and con- 
sistent L-theory v. We claim that o fulfills the required condition. Clearly 
xR m o holds. Assume that z is such that uRnz .  I f  ~uRSz  holds, then for 
some B, DSB E u and ~B ~ z. But now by construction, [2nB E 1) and so 
B ~ z, a contradiction. 
Thus condition h! holds. 
Lemma h2. For L = H2K, (S, R)  fulfi l ls condit ion h2. 
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Proof.  Let x ~ S. We are looking for  u and o as in condit ion h2. First let 
us cc)nstruct u. We claim that the fol lowing theory is consistent: 
u 0 = {AlramA ~ x} U (DnBIOr<)sB ~ x} U (OnE -~ ranEIE arbitrary} 
Otherwise for some Ai ,  B k,  Ej as above we have: 
~- A -~ "-, D"B  v V~ (o"L;.  ^  o "  ~ E,.), 
b DmA "* ram(on ~'B v V i (OnEi ^  O n "~ El) ) 
(let A =AA i, B = ABk). Thus since l:]mA ~ x,  we get that  
ram(on ~ B v V i (O" Ei ^ ~" ~ Ei)) ~ x . 
By distributing we get 
Din(C2 '1 "" B v A ~n(v i  E{(i))),  
eel 
where I is a suitable set o f  functions e such that e(i) = T or F and ET=E 
and E F = ----E. 
We also have 
ra m A c2n(~Bv V iE f  u)) 
eEI 
and so by Axiom H2, for k ; zard(I) we get: 
OrD s A (~BvVi " [ ( i ) )Ex  
ee l  
or 
Or Us(~B v Ai (E  i ^ ~" Ei))  E x ,  
that is or D s ~ B E x ,  which contradicts the fact that ~r osB E x. 
So u 0 is consistent, and we can extend it to a complete and con~istent 
theory u. 
We want now ~:o construct  a o as required by condit ion h2. We dis- 
tinguish two cases: 
Case 1. For  no B do we have OnB E u. 
This means that (~3z) (uRnz) .  We can therefore take v 0 = (AlrarA ~ x} 
which is certainly consistent, extend it to a complete and consistent 
theory o and now these u and v certainly fulfill condit ion h2 because 
(Vz, z')  (u R n z ^  o RSz ' -~ z = z') holds vacuously. 
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Case 2. There remains the construction of  o for the case that for some 
z, uRnz holds. Note that in this case we cannot have DnA ^  r'l n "A  E u, 
for any A, because both A and ~A will have to be in z. Turning now to 
the construction of  o, we claim that the following theory is consistent: 
o o = {AtHrA E x) U {HSBIOnB~ u) .  
For otherwise for some A i , t3/(let A = AA i) we have: 
~-A -* ~ HSABi,  with <>nB/E u, 
F- DrA v D" <> s~ ABi,  
and since HrA ~ x, we get that Hro s ~ ABi ~ x, and therefore 
H n ~ AB/E u by the construction of u. Also by the construction of  u 
since ¢>nB/is in u, we must have H~B/~ u, i.e., on^B/E  u, a contradic- 
tion. 
Thus o 0 is consistent and can be extended to a complete and consis- 
tent theory o. We shall now show that the u and o thus constructed have 
the required properties. 
Let z, z' be such that u Rnz ^  oRSz ' holds. If for some A, A ~ z and 
~A E z', we get <)hA E u and so HSA ~ o by construction and hence 
A ~ z', a contradiction. Thus A E z implies A E z' which means that 
Z=Z ~. 
Lemma h3. For L = H3K, (S, R) fulfills condition h3. 
Proof. SupposexR mu^ xRrv ,  for somex,  u, vES .  We want to find a 
z with the property urn: .  ^  oRSz. We cl~im that the following theory is 
consistent: 
z o = (AIDmA ~- u} U (BIDSBE o). 
For otherwise for some Ai,  B/as above (let A = AAi~ B = AB/) we have 
t--A ~ ~B so I-- c'mHnA -~ <>mort ~B.  
Sin, ce <>"' DnA E x, we get that ¢>m v1 n "~B E x. But from H3 we get 
Hro  s ~B and so ¢>s ~B ~ o, a cofltradiction. 
Now extend z0 to a complete and consistent theory z, and this z has 
the properties required by h3. 
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4. Remark 
In the completeness proofs at~ove, S was not necessarily countable. 
This is not a serious problem since we can proceed as follows: 
Let x be a consistent and complete theory of L. Let S' ~ S be the 
smallest subset of S that is closed under the following condition 
(1 )x~ S'. 
(2) If u ~ S' and for some A, OA ~ u, then for some o ~ S', A ~ o and 
uR o hold, (Lemma 2.1). 
(3) (S', R) is closed (or fulfills) the condition h for the semantics of L. 
An examination of the semantic onditions h i -h3  shows that if we 
begin with {x} and close under ( 1 )-(3) we end up with a countable set. 
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Chapter 3. The reduction method for modal systems 
The purpose of this chapter is to give in details a strategy for applyiag 
the reduction method to modal propositional calculi stronger than 
Lemmon's C-2. Given ,~ logic L 3C-2, all we have to do is to provide it 
with a semantics that is expressible in ScoS (the decidable monadic sec- 
ond order theory of ~0 successor functions, to be described below). 
However, L may be known to have a semantics characterized by some 
condition h as in Chapter 2. It is therefore more practical to give a gener- 
al strategy that deals with logics that can be characterized by a general 
semantical condition F (or h). 
We begin ~oy quoting a theorem of Rabin. Let co* be the set of all 
finite sequences of natural numbers, including the null sequence 0. Ele- 
ments of co* shall be denoted by a, b, c, x, y, z . . . . .  Let Prz, qn, rn, be 
the functions on co* defined by: 
p,, (a) = a* (3 n), 
qn(a) =a*(3n + 1), 
rn(a) = a*(3n + 2) 
(where * denotes concatenation of ~equences, i.e., Pn (a) is obtained by 
adding (3n) to the sequence a). Thus the successor functions of ~* are 
divided into three disjoint sets. Let -~ denote the lexicographic orderil,,g 
of co*. Define 
ao l  b iff (3n) (b = rn(a)) ,  
a 02 b iff (3 it) (b = q,, (a)) ,  
ao3 b iff (3n) (b = rn(a)).  
Theorem I (Rabin, [26]). The monadic second order theory o f  the 
model  below is decidable (~ *, 01 , / )2 ,03 ,  -<, Pt , P2 , P3 .. . . .  
ql , q2 , q3 , "", rl , r2 , r3 . . . . .  ~). 
Remark 2. By monadic second-order theory we mean that we can quan- 
tifv over variables C, X, P, Y of subsets of co*. 
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Let p~ denote the transitive closure of Pi,  i = 1,2, 3 and ~i denote 
the reflexive closure of p~. 
(a) The notion "C is a finite set" is definable in our language by say- 
ing "C is well ordered by < and its co,werse". 
(b) We may now define, for example, the transitive closure of Pl 
(denoted by p~) as follows: a p~ b iff there exists a finite set C whose 
iexicographic first element is a and for every x in C, x is the Pl prede- 
cessor ofx 's  lexicographic successor in C, and finally, b ~ C. 
(c) Equality is defined as follows: 
a = b iff  (VC) (a ~ C ,-, b ~ C).  
Rabin does not prove the above form of his theorem, but it follows im- 
mediately from his interpretations. 
Let us now use Rabin's theorem to obtain general theorems of decid- 
ability for propositional calculi. 
Definition 3. Let M be a class of propositional Kripke structures, of the 
form (N, S, R, O, D). Let F be a sentence in the language con~:aining a 
symbol R for R, O for O, N fe rN ,  equality and variables for elements 
of S. M is said to be def ined  by  F if M is the class of all structures 
(N, S, R, O, D) such that F is classically valid at (N, S, R, O). 
Definition 4. Assume that (N, S, R, O) is a model of F. Let us construct 
a new model (N*, :S*, R*, O*, D* ). Let S* be the set of all sequences of 
the form (0, t 1 ..... t n) where ti E S and OR t 1 , t I R t2, ..., tn_ q R t n hold 
Define R* on S* by the clause: 
(0, t l ,  . . . ,  t,, ) R* (0, Sl, ..., s m ) iff (def) m = n + 1, and t i = s i for i ~< n. 
Let O* = (O) and let D*(O, t I , . . . ,  tn)  be D r (i.e., for all atomic q, 
D*((0 . . . .  , t ) ,q )  = D(t ,  q). Let N* = {(0, .... t) lt  ~ N}.  Define R' on S* by 
(0 . . . . .  t )R ' (O  . . . .  , s )  iff (def) tRs.  
Lemma 5. (a) R* c_ R'. 
(b) (N*, S*, R', O*) satisf ies F i f  F does  not  conta in  pos i t ive  9ccur- 
rences o f  equal i ty.  
Proof. (a) is clear. 
To prove (b) we show by induction that, for any formula F '  of the 
language with R and O and any assignment x -~ (0 ..... t i) to the vari- 
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ables, F'(..., (0 ..... ti),...) holds at (N*, S*, R', O*) iff F'( .... t i .... ) 
holds at (N, S, R, O). 
For atomic F' this is clear. Negation and implications present no dif- 
ficulties, neither does the existential quantifier. 
Lemma 6. For all formulas A, 
[A ]*(0,..., t) ,= [,a ]t = [AI'(0 ..... t), 
where [A ]* is the value in (N, S*, R*, 0", D*) and [A ]' is the rahte in 
(N,S*,R',O*,D*). 
ProoL By induction on A. 
Definition 7. Since S* is countable there exists an isomorphic embedding 
g of S* as a subset T of co* ; in fact T can be taken to be T ~ {xl 0p I x}, 
R* can be identified with Pi" O* can be identified with 0. Now R' ~_R* 
is an extension of R* and therefore its image g(R') is a relation on T. Of 
course g(R') is not necessarily definable in SwS. g is not unique. 
Definition 8. Let R(a, b, C) be a formula with two element variables and 
one set variable C and possibly additional variables of the language of 
$6oS, and let $(C, C 0) be a formula of two set variables and possibly addi- 
tional parameters of this language. Let M be a class of structures defined 
by a formula F. We say that (S, R, 0) is adequate for F if for every struc- 
ture (N, S, R, O, D) ~ M there exists an embedding g of(N*, S*, R*, O*) 
(of Definition 7) into co* with T being the image of S*, the restriction 
ofpl  to T being the image of R*, 0 the image of O*, and T O the image 
of N, such thai the following holds (for some values of the parameters 
of R and S): 
(al) $(T, T 0) holds. 
(a2) $(C, C o) ~ 0 e C ^  Co g C. 
(b) $6oS I- (¥a,b)(ae T^ be  T^ ap I b-* R(a,b,T)). 
(c) For all values of the parameters and all C, C~ ifS(C, C 0) holds 
then the model (C O , C, R c, O) satisfies F, where R" is the restriction (or 
relativization) of R to C (since C appears in R: first restrict o C' and 
then substitute C for C'). 
(d) R r c g(R') (see Definition 7). 
Example 9. Let Y be K4 (or B or T or S4 or S5); then Y is definable by 
a formula F that says that R is transitive (respectively, symmetric or 
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reflexive or both transitive and reflexive or an equivalence r lation), and 
N = S. Let 
S(C, C o) = 0 E C ^ (vb)lb E C-~ (b = ~ or ~Pl b) 
A (Va) (a pl b -~ a ~ C) l ^ CO 
=C,  
for all cases, and let R (a, b, C) be the transitive (respectively the symme- 
tric or reflexive or both the transitive and reflexive or the transitive 
reflexive and symmetric) closure of P l- 
Example 10. Let M be the class of all (S, R, O, D) such that 
(S, R, O) ~- (¥ t, s) ( t Rm + l ~ -~ t R s) (m fixed) where R n is defined by: 
t R° s is t = s, t Rk + l s is (3r) ( t Rk r ^ r R s). (Recall that omission of N 
means S = N.) Let S(C, C 0) be as in Example 9 and let R(a, b) be: 
"There exists a finite set G such that either G is empty and a Pl b or 
the following four conditions hold", 
where: 
(a) G is linearly ordered by O~ ; 
(b) (Vx, y E G) (y is the p~ successor in G o fx  impl iesxp lm y),. 
(c) ac t ; ;  
(d) l fb  0 is the p~ last element of G then b 0 Pl b). 
R(a, b) says that there exists a natural number n such that ag~m+lb. 
It is easy to show that 
R(a,b O) ^  R(b O, bl)  ^ ...^ R(bm_ 1 , bin) 
implies R(a, bra). 
This example would show that K ÷ nA -. EIm+IA is decidable. Thl~ 
logic is identical with the system H 1K for the choice of parameter 
(m,n , r , s )  =(O,m + l, O, 1), 
i.e., K + om*lA -~ OA. More details are given in the next chapter. 
Theorem 11. Let Y be a propositional logical system containing C-2 that 
is complete for a cZass o f  propositional structures M which is defined by 
a sentence F. Assume further that there exist two formulas o f  S~S, 
S(C, C o) and R(a, b, C) that are adequate for F. Then Y is decidable. 
Proof. Let (?4, S, R, O, D t) be a countable model of A with t~he prcperty 
that F holds at (N, S, R, O). Since S and R are adequate for F there ex- 
ists an embedding, of (N*, S*, R*, O*) into ~,~* v,ith (T o , T, 01, ¢J) as 
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image such that conditions (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Definition 8 holds. 
For a ~ T define D a to be Dg_ I ta)" 
Lemma 12. For all sentences A [A Ix = [A ]r~x ~ . Where [A tx is" the rattle 
o.f A in (N*, S*, R*, O*, D*) and [A 1Tn t~ the t,alue of  A at the model 
(T O ,T, RT( , ,T ) ,0 ,  Oa),aCT". 
Proof. For atomic A this holds by definition, v and ~ present ctiificulties. 
Assume that [QA ]* = 0 and x ~ N*, the~l for some y such tha~ xR*y,  
X 
[A ]9", = 0. Since g is an isomorphic embeddi,ag, (x) Pl g(v) holds and by 
condition (8b), R(g(x), g(y), TJ holds and so [I-IA ]~x) =0 by the induc- 
tion hypothesis. 
Assume that [El A ]g~x) = 0 and g(x) E T o. "I'he;~ by definitiol~ for some 
a such that R(g(x), a, T), we have [A ]a r = 0. Let y = g-l(a). By tile induc- 
tion hypothesis, [A iy = 0. Now by Condition (8d) we must have x R 'y  
a~ 
and therefore by Lemma 6 [n A ]' = 0 and so If3 A Ix = 0. Recall that X 
x E N, i f fg(x) E T o . Thus Lemma 12 is proved. 
Definition 13. Let A be a formula of propositional calculus with the 
atomic propositions p I ..... p,, and let $(C, C o) and R(a,b, C) be as in 
Definitio~l 8. We shall associate with A a fortnula An(y) of S~S with 
the free variable y and free set variables P1 ..... Pn as follows: (A" depends 
on R(a,b,  C) as well) 
(a)  =- y e,. 
(b) (~A) ~ = ~ 4 # 
(c) (A vB) ~ = A#(y) vB#(y)  
(d) (D A) # = (Vy') (R (y, 3") ~ A#(y ')) ^  y E C 0 . 
As you can see, A # contains quantifiers. Let A ~c be like A ~ except that 
all quantifiers are restricted to C (i.e., since C appears in A ~ one has first 
to re!?,tivise to C' and the substitute C). 
Lemma 14. Let Y, S attd R be as in Theorem 11, then for all B, Y t- B iff 
I-- (vc, c 0) (vP  . . . . .  P,,) (S(C,  Co) ^  q'(Pl, .--, e,,, C, Co) 
where ~(PI ..... P,~, C, C 0) = AlP i c_ C. (Where an open formula is prov- 
able in SwS iff the universal closure is. )a 
3 We are using .I, r,xther than AiP  i ~ ¢ because later on, when we learn about the transfer prop- 
erty, we will use a different q,. 
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Proof. (a) Assume Y k- B. Since Y is complete for M, B holds at the any 
model (S, R, O, D t) such that (S, R, O) is a model of F. 
Now assume that S~S I--- B#c(o). Then for some C, C O c_ w" such 
that $(C, C 0) and some Pi c C, B#c(o, Pi) is false at the model 6J*. Let 
us now define a model of M in which B is false. LetDa(Pi) = 1 iff 
aEP  i, l ~ i~n,  
Lemma 15./;'or the model (C O , C, R, 0, D t) the jbllowing holds;for any 
]brmula A(Pl ..... Pn) (with the same propositional variables as B) and 
any y E C, 
[A 1 c = i i f f  A=C(.v, Pi) holds. 
Proof. By induction. For A atomic this follows from Definition 13(a) 
and the definition ofD a. The cases ofv and --, also follow easily from 
13(b) and 13(c), 
The case of I:IA follows from t3(d) and the induction hypothesis. 
In view of Lemma 12 we get that [Bi 0 = 0, since B#¢(O, Pi) does not 
hold, But (C, R) fulfills F (and hence is a model of Y) by our assump- 
tions (of Theorem 1 ! and Definition 10(c)). Which means that Y ~ B, 
contrary to our assumptions. Thus the " i f"  of Lemma 14 is proved. 
(b) Now assume that Y I-/B. Then for some model (N,S, R, O, D t) in M, 
we have [B] 0 = 0. Construct (N*, S*, R*, O*, D~) of Definition 4. Since 
S(C, C 0) and R(a, b, C) are adequate for F, there exists a function g and 
some values for the parameters of R such that g(S*) = T, g(N*) = T O , 
g (R*) = O l and g (O*) -- 0, and the properties of Definition 8 are fulfilled. 
Taking D o to be Dg_l(a), we obtain a model (T, R ( - , -T ) ,  Or Dr) for 
which Lemma 13 holds. By Lemma 6, [B]~" = 0. 
Let Pi = {alDa(Pi) = 1} then by Lemma 15, BuT(O, Pi) is false in N*, 
and so since S(T) holds we get the other direction of Lemma 14. 
Theorem 11 follows from Lemma 14 and the decidability is SwS. 
The reader should note that Theorem 11 is a special case of the 
following: 
Theorem 16. Let Y be a modal (or intuitionistic) calculus. Assume that 
there exist Jbrmulas S(C, Co), R(a,b, C)and e~(Pl,... , Pn, C, C o) of  
SwS with possible parameters such that Y is comph, te for the class of  
models M defined below. Then Y is decidable. 
258 D.M. Gabbay / Decidability results in not~-classical logics 
Definition of M. (Co, C, R, ~}, D) is in M iff 
(I) S~oS f- S(C,C o) ^  ¢~ c_ CA ~E C. 
(2) For any (possible qual) atomic ql .... , q , ,  
ScoS ~- ~(Q1,... ,  Q~,, ¢, Co), where Ql = {x ~ CiD(x, qi) = 1) 
Proof. Lemma 14 holds[ 
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Chapter 4. Some decidability results 
259 
Before we turn to more general conditions for decidability and learn 
new methods, let us obtain some immediate results and give several non- 
t:'ivial examples in full detail. 
1. Simple results 
Table 2 presents several well known modal systems that can be shown 
decidable by the methods of Chapter 3. We chose these systems from 
Table 2 
System Y Condition F(Y) 
D2 
E2 
T(C) (also called K) 
T(D) 
T 
E3 
S4 
$5 
B 
$2 
$3 
$2 n 
KI of [28] 
K2 of 128] 
$4.3 
K + the axiom 
O A .-", Orn+ lA 
(Vx~ N) (3y~ S) (xR  y) 
(Vx) (x R x) 
N=S 
F(T(C)) A F(D2) 
F(T (C)) A F(.~2) 
R is transitive. 
F(T) ^ F(E3) 
N = S A (Vxy) (xRy)  
N = S and R is symmetrical 
O~ N ^ (Vx) (xRx)  
F(S2) A F(E3) 
(Vx) (xRx)  A Arn<n (Vx) (ORmx ~ x ~N)  
F(S4) ^  (Vx) (3 y) (Vz) (x R y ~ y R z --, :,' = z) 
F(S4) A (3 y) (Vx) (X R y) 
R is a reflexive and transitive linear order ,and N = S 
N = S A (Vx,y)  (xRmy .-* xR  y) 
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[20] .  The names we use for the systems are those of [20}. We do not 
quote the axioms, only the respective semantic ondition F )hat corre- 
sponds to each of the systems. That is, in Table 2, the system Y named 
on the left hand side (and whose axioms can be found in [20]) is com- 
plete for the class of all models (N, S, R, O, D) that fulfill the cc~dition 
F(Y) mentioned in the right hand side. 
To show decidability, we find for each system Y mentioned above, 
corresponding formulas S(y) ( C, C o ) and R ( Y) (a, b, C, C O ) adequate 
for the respective F(Y), and thus decidability follows from Lemma 12 
(or Theorem 11) of Chapter 3. 
Table 3 gives S, R for each system (Table 2). 
Table 3 
Y R(Y) 
D2 R =Pl  
E2 R(a,b)  = ap!  b V a = b 
s(Y) 
S(C, Co) = (Ve E C) (O ~ a) A Co ~ C 
A (V¢~ Co) (3b~C)(e lp l  b) 
A ~EC A (Wa, b ) (b~e Aap l  b~a~C)  
O~CA (Va~ C) (Opl a) ACo E C 
A (Vo, bEC) (bEC Aap lb~a~C)  
T(C) = K 
T(D) 
T 
E3 
$4 
$5 
R=pl  
R=pl  
R(E2) 
e = (O = ~) 
S(E2) ^  (7o = C 
S(D2) A Co = C 
S(T(C)) 
S(E2) 
S(T) 
S(T) 
B 
$2 
$3 
$2 n 
Kr. 
K2 
$4.3 
R(a,b)  =ap l  b V bp i  a 
R(E2) 
R(E3) 
R(S2) 
R(a,b)  =a~! b Vb 
= qo(0)  
R(a, b) = 
= (a @ q~ i,b * C) Aa-.<b) 
Va= ¢ 
S(T) 
S(E2) A 0 ~ Co 
8($2) 
S($2) A Am< n (Va ~ C) (~ p~n a -  a ~ Co) 
S(S4) A (Va~C)(3b~C)(Vc~C)  
× (a~l b A~ap~ c) 
S(C, Co) = (C = Co) A C non-empty 
^ (Wa~C)(~ta  Va =qo(0)) A (Va, b) 
× (b~CAb~qo(O)Aa~lb~aEC)  
N(C,C o) = (C = Co) ^  C non-empty A ~ ~ C 
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Recall that ~ is the lexicographic (reflexive) ordering and q0 is a 
successor function. For K + DA ~ lqm+lA see Example 10, Chapter 3. 
The reader can verify in each case that the $(Y), R (Y) suggested 
are adequate for F~ Y). In the case of $4.3 we should recall that (co*, ,~ ) 
is a dense linear order and therefore very linearly ordered set (S, R, O) 
is embeddable in it. 
The semantics for K2 is e~'~actly like that of K 1, except hat there ex- 
ists a top element q0(0)- Strictly speaking, Theorem 11 of Chapter 3: 
does not exactly apply here, but Theorem 16, Chapter 3 applies, for the 
xI, of Lemma 12, Chapter 3. 
2. More decidability results 
The systems below are decidable because ither Theorem 11 or 
Theorem 16 of Chapter 3 apply. 
Theorem 2.1. Y = K + (A -* ~mA)  is decidable. 
Proof. According to Chapter 2, Y is complete for the condition F(Y)  
saying 
(Vu, v ) (uR  mO~ u = v).  
Lemma 2.2. ( O RraO ) implies that our set o f  possible worlds S is circular 
with m elements. 
Proof. Assume ORmO. Then for some o I .... , orn_ 1 we have 
O R o I ..... o i R oi+ l , ... , o,~_ 1R O. 
Now let v i Ru  hold. Then vi+ 1Rmu and therefore u = oi+ t . 
Lemma 2.3. I f  "~O Rm O holds, then (~ 30) (OR m v) holds and therefore 
in the corresponding (S*, R*, 0" )  o f  Definition 4, Chapter 3 we also 
have (~ 3 o) (O'R* mv). 
Proof. Any element a such that O*R *m a must give rise to a v witl'. ORmvl 
Note that F(Y) holds i~a any (S*, R*, O*) in which (~ 3 o) (O'R* '~ o) i 
is true. 
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Define S(C, C 0) for our case 
s (c ,  Co) = [c  = Co ^ 
A 
^ 
v lC= Co = 
by saying: 
0~ C^ (Va~ C)(0~l a) 
(Va, b ) (bE  C Aaf~l b.-, aE C) 
(3a) (0 p'~'a ^ a ~ C)l 
(po(O ..... p.,_~ tO), 0}I. 
Define R(a,b) to be Pl in case (~3a ~ C) (~p~)a) and let R be .circular 
on C in case C = {0, Pi(O)}. Thus K + (A -~ E]mA) is decidable. 
Theorem 2.4. K + (hA  ~ Dm+lA) is decidable. 
Proof. This is the system of Example 10, Chapter 3. We give additional 
details here. Let S(C, C o) be defined as in that example. Let T be such 
$(T, T,~ holds. Then (T, Pl ) is a tree. Define R(a, b) by: aRb iff there 
exists a finite set C such that a ~ C and b 0 ~ C (where b 0 is the prede- 
cessor of b) and C is linearly ordered by p~ aria, for every t, d in C, i fd  is 
tile p'~ successor of r in C, then rp~ d. In simpler terms: aRb iff 
(3n) (ap~'m÷lb). We now show that DA ~ E]m+IA holds in this seman- 
tics. Le~ a be such that [E]A] a = 1, [E3m+lA]a = 0, then for :;ome 
aRboRb lR  "" Rb m , [A ]am = 0. That is we have n o ... n m such that 
n,~nom + 1/~ ,~ ,~nmm+ 1/,, 
*~tal ~'0 ~t  . . . .  , e l  t, m , therefore we have 
ap]n~+nl+" '+nm+l)m+lbm,  i.e., aRb m . 
A comradiction. 
We now turn to prove completeness. In Chapter 2 we showed com- 
pletevess for a semantics with the property 
(Vu, o) (u pm+t v " u R v). 
We now "open" R into a tree (S*, R*, O*) as in Chapter 3, Definition 4. 
We shall show that if we define in this tree the relation R then we still 
get elementarily equivalent structure. 
Lemma 2.5. u Rn'm+lo-> u Ro. 
ProoL By induction. 
Lemma 2.6, (0 ..... z,)R(0 .... o) ~ uRu. 
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Proof. (0 .... , u)R(O .... , o) iff for some n, (0 .... • u) Onl'm+l(o, ..., v) iff 
u R n'm+ l o which implies u R o. 
l .emma 2.7. For any a, A, [A ] a m (T,p 1 ) = [Ale in (T,R).  
Proof. Follows from preceding lemma. 
Thus the completeness proof is concluded. 
Theorem 2.8. K + (ra~'O A -* OA) iv decidable. 
Proof. Let T c ¢o" be such that 0 ~ T and for every a ~ T, 0 P~ a for 
some n, and b E T and a~ 1 b implies a E T. Let r o be a new successor 
(Pl is defined through Pn successorship). Let L ~ co* have the properties: 
(a) bE  L -* (~a E T) (b = re(a)). 
(b) re(r) ~ L -~ (3a ~ T) (ap T r) 
(c) (Va ~ T) (3! b ~ T) (ap T b A ro(b ) ~ L). 
We now define 
aRb i f fa# 1 b or there exists a finite set C such that C is lineariy order- 
ed by 0~ and the predecessor f b is an element of C and for every r in 
C, ro(r) is in L and if r o is the O~ first element of C, then aor~ r o and if 
r E C and r' is the 0~ successor in t7 of r then rp~ r'. 
Lemma 2.9. (Va)(3a o) (¥r(aoRr-+ aRr)  ^  aRm ao ). 
Proof. We know that there exists a unique a 0 such that aortae and 
ro(a o) ~ L. We take this a 0 . Assume a 0 R r, then either (by definiti, m) 
a0 Pl r, and in this case (by definition) aRt  ol there exists a fimte ¢ 
such that the condition above is fulfilled, and the predecessor f r is in 
C. Take C' = C u {a0}, then, since ro(ao) E L ;rod apn~ ao we get (by 
definition, using C') that aRr. 
We now show that f -ira OA ~ OA holds. Let a be such that  
[ra m OA ]a = 1 and [OA ] a = 0, then at a o, (apT a o ^  ro(a o) ~ L), A holds. 
So there exists a r such that aoRr and [A]r = 1, but aoRr implies ar t  
so that [OA ]a = 1. 
We now prove completeness. From Chapter 2 it follows that this sys- 
tem is complete for the semantics with the following property: 
(Vu) (3 t) (u R m t ^  (¥t ' )  (tR t' -> u R t')). 
We "open" R into a tree (S*, R*, O*) as in Definition 4, Chapter 3, thc:n 
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for every a = (0,..., t~) there exists a a 0 = (0 ..... u, ..., t) such that 
apTa o and ( iCt ')(tRt' -~ uRt ' ) .  We put t0(a0) ~ L. We now have to 
show that if we define R as above, we still get elementarily equivalent 
structure, that is: (A ]a in (T, Pl ) = [A ]a in (T, R). This follows from 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.10. (0 ..... a)R(O ..... b) -~ aRb.  
Proof. By induction on the number of elements in the set C involved in 
the definition of R. 
(a) For C empty we get aRb.  
(b) Let 
(0, ..., a) pT(O ..... Cl ) P~1 n, ..., Ptl"(O, ..., On-l), 
Pl (0, ..., d) Oil "-1 (0 ..... c,,) Pl (0 ..... b) . 
We have therefore, by induction hypothesis, aRd holds, and since 
r0((0, ..., c,)) ~ L we have 
dRm- l  c, A aRd,'~ c, Rb-*  aRb.  
Theorem 2.11. The following extensions o f  K are decidabh'. 
(1) D(E]A -+A). 
(2) D(ODA ~A) .  
(3) ©(B ~ B) --, (DA ~ A). 
(4) O(A~_- 1 (OA i-* DAi)), k i> 1. 
(5) DA ~ []rTA;r~OA -. Ot2A. 
(6) O[]A -~ DA. 
Proof. These logics are complete for tile following requirements on the 
relation R (resp.) 
(1) uRt~ tRt .  
(2) uRt  ^  tRt ' -~ t 'Rt .  
(3) uRt-~ uRu.  
(4) (Vu) (3 to ) (uRt  o ^  (Vt, t ' ) ( t  o Rt  ^ to r t ' ->  t = :'). 
(5) Condition (4) + transitivity. 
(6) uRo  ^  uRv'-~ vRo' .  
Conditions (1) - (5)  r,~main true when we pass to the tree strt cture 
(S*, R*, O*) of Definition 4, Chapter 3, and since they are expressible 
in our monadic language we get decidability. We now turn to (6). 
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Lemma. Condit ion (6) implies O Rm o ^  ORno ' --* vRv ' .  
The proof is by induction. 
We now define the semantics in ScoS, for each Case (1)--(6). Let 
(T ,p  l) be as in the Proof of Theorem 2.4. Define R for each case by: 
( l )  aRb  ,~ apl  b or a ~ O^ a= b. 
(2) aRb ~, aPl b or a, b ~ OA bP l  a. 
(3) aRb ~ ap  I b o r  (3 r )  (ap~ r A a = b). 
(4) Require on T that 
(VaE T) (ab~ I")(ap I b^ (Vr, dE  T ) (bP l  r^ bp l  d-+ r = d). 
(5) Take (T, p~) and require (4) for p~. 
(6) Def ineaRb o a = 0aaa lb  or  a, b ~ O. 
In case of (6) completeness follows from the lemma above and Lemma 
5, Chapter 3. The rest is immediate. 
Theorem 2.12. K + (omrq A -~ VIA) is decidable. 
Proof. According to Chapter 2, this system is complete for the semantics 
with the property; 
uRm o I A uR  o 2 -~ v 1R b 2 . 
Lemma 2.13. xRkmo  ^  xRu  -~ vRu.  
Proof. By induction; for k = 0,1 this holds. Let xR km+m o ^ xR u, then 
for some o I , x R km v I ^ v I R rav n x R u so we have that o I R m o n O 1Ru 
and consequently vRu.  
Lemma 2.14. xRkmo a xR lm+lu  -~ oRu.  
Proof. For some v I , u I , we have 
xRv 1AD1Rkm- IoAxRImul  ^  ul Ru  
and therefore u1 Ro 1 which implies u I Rk" 'v  A U 1Ru and thus vRu.  
Lemma 2.15. Let  xRa  1 and a lRa2 ,  ..., and am_ iRa  m and let xRb I and 
b lR  b 2 and ... and b k R bk÷ 1 and k < m. Then t: k Rbk+l and b k t~'ak+ 1. 
Proof. Induction on k. 
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Case k = 1. xRm am ^  xRb I ^ xRa  1 implies a taRa I A amRbl .  Since 
a lRm- lam ,~ a m Rb I we get a I R m b 1 and therefore a: Ra2 -* b I Ra  2 . 
Case k. Assume a/ Rb/+ 1 ^  b/Ra/+ 1 for all] < k. We want to prove 
this for k. We have agRm- lak_  1 (since amRal ) ,  therefore we get 
ak R m bg and ag Rak+ 1 so bk Rak+l.  Using the latter, we get that 
bk Rm-  l ag_ l so that bk Rm ak and bk R bk + 1 so ak R bt~ + 1 . 
Lemma 2.16. I f  for  some x we have a t such that xR  m t, then for  every 
z, n such that xRn z we have (3t)  (z R mt).  
Proof. We have the following: 
xRb lRb  2 , . . . ,Rb  n = z, 
xRa lRa  2 . . . . .  Ra  m = t .  
In case n < m, we get that b n Ran+ 1 and an+ 1Rman+l.  In case n > m, 
we have bin_ 1 Ra  m and amRa 1 so (3t)(bm__ 1R 'n t) and bm~_ l Rn'z with 
n' < n. So we prove our claim by induction. 
Lemma 2.17. xRSm+kv  ^ xR lm+k+lu  ~ oRu,  k < m. 
Proof. For some u 0 , v 0 , we have x R smv o ^  v o R k v ^  x R rm * l u 0 A U 0 R k u 
and we may therefore conclude that v o R u 0 and therefore 
VoRko A ooRk+lu and so vRu.  
Let T c_ 6o* be as in Theorem 2.8. We define aRb for a, b E T as fol- 
lows: aRb iff there exist r, C 1 , C2, such that rE  C 1 and rE  C 2 and 
C 1 , C 2 are finite and linearly ordered by p] and if d'  is the p~ successor 
:in C 1 (in C9) o fd  then dp~d'  and i f r  1 (r2) is the last element of 
C 1 (C2) then r 1 p~a (r 2 pk+l b). 
Lemma 2.18. aRm b ^ aRr-+ b Rr,  
Proof. Let aRb 1R .... , Rbm_ 1Rb.  Since aRb 1 , this means (by defir~ition) 
that we have the following: For some e I , k l ,  l I , we have 
e lPk l la^e lpt l lb lA ( l l  -k l )=  1, modm.  
Assume for induction that there exists e i , ki ,  l i such that 
k i e i p, a ^ e i pl~ bi ^ (1 i __ ki ) = i, rood m.  
We now prove this for hi+ 1 . 
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Since b i Rb i . l ,  we have the tol!owing: 
ro bi ^ ro bi +1/' ( l -  k) = I, 
Case 1. 
rood m, 
e i 0~ r 0 . In ~his case take el+ 1 = e i. We have 
p~ -k+ ei+ I pkli a, ~i4rl I bi+ I , 
l l - k+ l -k i= l i -k i+ l~-k=i+ 1, modm.  
Case 2. r 0 Pl ei" In this case let el+ 1 = r0, then we have 
^k-li+k i 
ei+l P /b i+ l  , ei+l Pl  a, 
1-k+l i -k i= i+ 1, modm.  
We therefore conclude that there exists an e such that 
ePtl a ^  epSl b ^ s - t = 0, mod m. 
Now since aRt  we have for some d, n I , n 2 , p, 
d_n~.m+p dpnl2.m*p+l Pl aA  r .  
We distinguish two cases: 
( 1 ) ep~ d then 
ePSl b, ep~+(n2-nOm+lr, 
- s+t+(n2-n i )m+l  = 1, modm,  
and therefore bRr. 
(2) dp~ e. Then 
aa  m+'+l r, b, 
n2m+P+ l - s -n lm-p+t= 1, modm,  
and therefore bRr. 
for some r0, k, I. 
Lemma 2.19. In any structure with ordering (T R) our axiom holds. 
To prove decidability, we observe that in a tree (T,p 1) such that ' 
(',- 3a) (0 pgZ a). Our axiom also holds since <>m [] A is false, and indeed 
in this case #l = R. 
We now turn to prove completeness. Let (S, R, O) be a structure in 
the semantics of this logic. We pass to the respective, lementarily equiv. 
aient tree structure, (S*, R*, O*) of Definition 4, Chapter 3 and can as- 
sume that (T, Pl ,  ¢1) is its image in S~S under the isomorphising of 
Definition 7, Chapter 3. 
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Case 1. (~ 3 t) (OR m t) in this case the tree would fulfill 
(~3a) (Opera). So (T,p 1) would be equal to (T, R). 
Case 2. (3 t) (OR m t) in this case as our lemmas how us, we shall have 
that 
(a) (Vz) (~ t) (zR 'n t), 
(b )xR  sm+k V ^  xRrm+k+lu "* vRu .  
(c) In the respective tree, we have (13 ..... o)R(O ..... u) -, vRu. 
To prove (b) use (a) and the lemmas and to prove. (c) use (b). 
3. Transfer property 
In this section we offer a refiAement of our method. Up to now we 
have been dealing with logics Y that could be characterized by condi- 
tions F on the classes of models (N, S, R, O, D) by saying: 
Y is complete for the class of all models (N, S, R, O, D) 
such that (N, S, R, O) fulfills condition F. 
D was allowed to be arbitrary. Such logics Y are said to be characterized 
by frames. It is known (S.K. Thomason) that there exist logics that can- 
not be characterized by frames. In fact there exists a tense logic Y (with 
two modal operations) uch that for any model (S, R, O) (tense models 
look like ordinary modal models) there exists a D such that (S, R, O, D) 
is not a model of Y. Obviously in order to hope to give semantics for 
such Y's one must be prepared to allow restrictions on the possible D's. 
According to Makinson (see [ 15 ] for generalizations) any logic can be 
characterized bya family of specific models (N, S, R, O, D). It does not 
necessarily follows that there exists some F characterizing the family of 
allowable (N, S, R, O) and some condition ' I /of some sort, characterizing 
the allowable corresponding D's. 
We can look however at logics that can be characterized by conditions 
of the special form (F, q'), where F is a~ before and • is obtained as 
below. 
Given a model (N, S, R, O, D) and a formula B, let 
1~ = (x l  [B]  x = 1).  
The restriction ~ is a formula eg(P l ..... Pn, S, N), Pi c_ S, and we allow 
those D's that have the property that for any sequence q l  . . . .  , qn of 
atomic variables, q'(~t .... , qn, S,N) holds. 
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According to Theorem 16 of Chapter 3, if S,R are adequate for F 
and also condition ~I, is expressible in S~S by a formula ~,  then Y is 
decidable. 
This point of view is especially useful if condition F contains positiv,~ 
occurrences of equality. Suppose Y is complete for a condition F
(without any restriction on D) that contains positive occurrences o f - .  
Then given (N, S, R, O) fulfilling F, we can pass to (N*, S*, R*, 0") 
satisfies b, (see Definition 4, Chapter 3). Of course we can always 
define = by 
(0,..., x) - (0, . . . ,y) iffx =y 
and get that 
(N ' l - ,  S'l=-, R ' l - ,  O*i~-) ~ (N, S, R, O) 
(.~ means isomorphic), it may be the case that for some equivalence 
relation E c_ - the model (N*IE, S*iE, R'IE, O*IE) does fulfill condi- 
tion F. 
Let g be an embf;dding of (N*, S*, R*, O*) into co* as in Definition 7 
of Chapter 3. We may find formulas of S~oS, 
S(C, Co), R(a, b, C), E(a, b), 
such that (ColE, CIE, RIE,  01E) is isomorphic to 
(N*IE, S*IE, R'I E, O*IE). 
We therefore may get that Y i.~ complete for all the models of the 
form (C01E, CtE, R IE, ~IEL No~J instead of taking this model, we can 
take the model (C O , C, R, 0) and restrict D by the formula ~.  saying 
thatD(x ,q )  = 1 nxEy  -~ D(y,q'~ = 1 (or ifQ is the set variable corre- 
sponding to q w~ 
~(... Q ...) = ^  ... n (vxy)  (x E Q ^ xEy  -~ y E Q) ^  ... n . 
among other conjuncts of ~I,. 
In most logics, cnndition ~ above is not equivalent to satisfaction i  
(C01E, CIE, RIE, OlE), i.e., although the values of atomic q agree on all 
E equivalent points, this does not hold for arbitrary B, built up from 
these q's. For some logics however, (those who have a convenient F) the 
property ~ does tra~.sfer to arbitrary B (Definition 8 below). For these 
logics, we get decidability, because we can express atisfaction as in 
Theorem 16, Chapte r 3. 
The following is a definition of the transfer property. 
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Definition 3.1. Let (F, ko) be a condition on (N, S, R, O, D) as explained 
above. We say that xI, has the transfer property,  if, for any model 
(N, S, R, O, D) such that F holds in (N, S, R, O), (a) impfies (b): 
(a) 'I'(~i, S, N) holds for any choice of atomic qi of the language; 
(b) ~(B i, S, N)  holds for any wffB. 
Example 3.2. For example if you require that (S, R, O) is a linear Jrder- 
ing ($4.3 model) and require tk, t for each atomic q, {x lD(x ,q )  = 1} is 
either f inite or its complement is finite, then this condition transfers for 
all B tmilt up from such q. This condition is clearly expressible in SwS, 
and therefore, since F($4.3) is also expressible in S~S, we get a decid- 
able logic. 
The theorems below contain decidability results through expressing 
the semantics of the respective logics in SwS and using some spedal 
formulas with the transfer property. 
Theorem 3.3. K + (kgrnA -+ <>hA) is decidable. 
Proof. Let (T, p~), T ~ w* be a tree as in Theorem 2.8. Let r 0 , r I be 
two additional successors. Let L c w* have the following propert;es: 
(a) a~ L ~ (3b~ T) (a=ro(b)  va  = rl (b)). 
(b) (Va ~ T) (3 !b ~ T) (ap~ b ^ to(b) ~ L ). 
(c) (Va ~ T) (3 [b ~ 13 (ap~b A r I (b) ~ L). 
(d) ro(b) E L ~ (3a E 13 (ao~ b)  ^  b E T. 
(e) r 1 (b) E L -~ (3a ~ 13 (apt 'b )  ^  b E T. 
(f) ~(3a ~ 7") (to(a) E L A I" 1 (¢I) E L). 
The class L characterizes two functions giving each a ~ T the values 
b 1 , b z resp. at a distance m, n resp. from a. We now define the relation 
R (depending on L) as follows: aRb i f fao lb  or 
(3 r)(ro'~ a A ro(a) ~ L ^ rp~ +l b A r ! (predecessor of b) E L) or 
( 3 r) ( r pT a A r 1 ( a ) ~ L A r o'~ + l b ^ r o (predecessor f b) ~ L). 
The (T, R) semantics gives rise to a certain system of modal ogic 
v, hich is of course decidable. We shall now show that our system 
K + (OmA ~ <>nAil has transfer property over this logic, for a property 
,/z restricting the assignments. 
Lemma 3.4. The property 
• (C) = (¥a) (Vb) (¥r) (ap'~ b A apt[ z r ^ ro(b) E L ^ r x (r) ~ L 
~(bEC~,r~C) )  
transfers. 
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Proof. The cases of "--, ^  present no difficulty. Assume b~ [] C, we want 
to show re  [] C. b ~ I:IC means that (Vb') (bRb '  -~ b' ~ C)  Assume 
rq~ I3C, then for some r' such that rRr '  we have that r' q- C. We shall 
proceed to arrive at a contradiction. By definition, rRr '  i ff any of 
Cases 1, 2, 3 below holds. 
Case I. rp I r'o in this case by definition bRr '  (see the st~~tement of  
this lemma (3.4) relating b to r). 
Case 2. (3d)  (d p~ r a rl (r) ~ L ^ d p~+l r ' A r o (predecesso~ o f t ' )  E L). 
Since L defines functions this implies that d = a and that b is the prede- 
cessor of r'. 
Case 3. (3d)  (dp] r ,x ro(r) ~ L ^ dp~ +1 r' ^ r I (predecessor f r') ~ L). 
In this case we have that ro(r~ ~ L ^ r l (r )  ~ L but this contradicts re- 
quirement (f). 
We now showy that for assignments hat fulfill the (transfer) property 
the axiom E]mA "~ OnA is valid. 
Let (A)T be the set of points in T such that A holds. Let a be such 
that [nmA ]a = 1. [[]n ,,, A 1 a = 1, and let b, r be the two points above a 
such that ap~ b ^ ro(b) ~ I A a#r~ r ^ r 1 (r) E L, then b ~ (A) r ~ r ~ (A) r .  
A contradiction, since a l~b  ^  aRm r holds. 
We now turn to prove completeness. From Chapter 2 we get complete- 
ness for the semantics with the property that (Vu) (3v) (uRnv A uR mv). 
Given any structure let us "open" R into a tree (S*, R*, O*) as we did 
in Definition 4, Chapter 3. We get an elementarily equivalent tree..struc- 
ture (S*, R*, O*). Let (0, ..., u) be an element of the tree, we know that 
there exists a v such that uRno  ^  uRmv.  This implies that for some 
t I , . . . ,  tn_ l ,S  1 .. . . .  sin_ 1 we have 
therefore 
uRt  I R t  2 R , . . . ,R tn_  l Ro,  
uRs  I Rs2 , . . . ,  Rsm_ 1 Ro ,  
(0 .... ,u )p~' (O , . . . ,u , s  1 .... ,v) ,  
(0 .... ,u )  p~(O .... ,u ,q , . . . , v ) .  
We would like to put ro((O, ..., u, t 1 , .... v)) in L and r I ((0, ..., u, sl ,..., v)) 
in L. This we cannot do so easily because of requirement (f). We may 
have that this v serves for some u' as well, and we may contradict (f). To 
overcome this difficulty, we transform (S*, R*) into a new set (S 0, po)  
such that we get elementarily equivalent structure and such that every 
element of S* has many duplicates in S O . To fulfill (f) as well, we may 
take different duplicates. 
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The construction is as follows: Let 
S O = {0} u {(a, n)l a ~ S ' ,  n E co} 
ard define (a ,m)R°(b ,n )  i f faR*b .  LetD(*a,n) be D~ (which is equal to 
D~t i f fa  is (0 .. . . .  u)). 
Lemma 3.5. [A ](a,n) = [A ]a" 
Proof. By induction on A. 
This construct ion enables us to define L in such a manner that condi- 
tions (a) .... , (O are fulfilled. We conc!ude the proo f  o f  the completeness 
theorem by showing that the R def ined using L has the fol lowing prop- 
erty. 
Lelama 3.6. (0, ..., u) R (0 .... , v) -~ uR v. 
Proof. Observe closely the definit ions of  L and of  R. Whenever we have 
(0 . . . . .  u)o~(O . . . . .  v l) ,  (0 . . . . .  u)o~"(O . . . . .  02) ,  
and 
to((0 . . . . .  ol))  E L, r 1 ((9 .. . . .  v2)) E L 
then v 1 = 0 2 . 
Theorem 3.7. K + (OmA -+ OnA)  is decidable.  
Proof. We may assume that m < n. 
By ,Chapter 2, this system is complete f~,r the semantics with the 
property x Rm u A x Rn o ~ u = o. 
Lemma 3.8. When m = n, we have 
ORm+ku  ^  ORm+kv -~ u = o. 
Proof. Induct ion on k. For  k = O, this is trivial; assume for k. Let  
ORm+kuo ^ uoRu A ORm+ko0 A voRv 
then u 0 = v 0 and therefore for some z such that zRm- lz to  we have 
z R m u ^ z R m o and thus u = v. 
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Lemma 3.9. IChen n = m + r and  r > O, asst ,me that  fo r  some t l , . . . ,  tr 
we have 
ORm tl A t l  R t  2 a ' ' '  A tr_l  R t  r ^ t rRt r+ 1. 
Then fo r  every  u i f  oRm+ku then  u = t i fo r  some i. 
Proof, Since ORmt!  ^ ORnt r+ l  we have t I = tr+ 1 . Wc now proceed by 
induction on k. For k = 0 we have ORmu ^ OR n tr+ 1 ~ u = tr+ 1 . Now 
let ORmul  ^ u lR  k u 0 ^ uoRu.  We conclude that u~ = tr+ 1 = t 1 , and 
also u 0 = t i tor some i. Since OR m+i t i , we have for some z, zR  m-1 t i 
and therefore zR  m u. On the other hand, 
t iR t i+  l . . .R t r+!  Rt  2 . . .R t  i . . . .  
therefore for some t/, we must have zR  n ti and therefore u = ti. 
We now turn to construct our tree semantics. We distinguish two 
cases: 
Case 1. m = n. Let (T,p l) be a tree like that of Theorem 2.8 with the 
property that ~pT+k a-~, a = p~n+k (0) (where P0 is the first successor 
functic~n. This is expressible in our language). Let Q c_ T be a set of some 
endpoints h ~ T such that (~ 3r ) (bp  I r) ^ OpT- lb .  Define 
aRb iff ap I b or a ~ Q ^ b = p~ (0) • 
That is, wlaat we do is for some points b at a distance m - 1 from 0, we 
put p~n(0) as successor. (It may be that p~n(0) ~ T!!, then we do nothing.) 
Lemma 3.i0. In this tree semant ics  aR  m b ^ aR m r-~ b = r holds. ICe 
there]ore conc lude  Om A -~ Om A holds. 
To prove completeness, we proceed as follows: Let (S , . ,  O) be a 
structure, then there are two possibilities: 
(1) (~  3 u) (OR m u). In this case we construct the usual (S*, R*, O*) 
tree-structure elementarily equivalent to (S, R, O) and we observe that 
also in this tree (~  3a)  (¢) R m a). 
(2) In case (3u  m ) (OR m u m ) we proceed as follows: Let u 1 .... , urn_ 1 
be such that ORu I ^ u 1Ru 2 ....  , urn_ 1 Ru  m . We now define the tree T. 
The elements of T are all increasing R-sequences (0, x 1 , ..., xp)  such the t
p ~ m-1  orp  >i m andx i = u i,i<<, m.  
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I.emma 3.11. For any a, b E T o f  length ~ m, we have that one is an 
initial segment o f  the oth,'r. 
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.8. We therefore may proceed to 
define 
p0((0, ..., ut)) = (0, .... u i , ui+ 1) 
and extend P0 uniquely above (0 ..... urn), if there exists any a such that 
(0, .... urn) Pl a. (That is we do not define the successor functions arbi- 
trarily as v:e did in previous theorem% but choose P0 as a particular func 
tion.) Define a ~ O i f fa  = (0, ..., Xm_ 1) and Xm_ 1 Ru  m . 
[,emma 3.12. (0, ..., x) R (0 ... . .  y )  ~ xR  y. 
Proof. By definition of R. 
We thus get completeness and therefore decidability for the case 
m=n.  
Case 2. m < n. Let (T, p l )  be a tree of the following form: 
( * )  .3 p'~ a --. a = p '~(O)  , 
and we have also p~n+l (~)) F T ..... p~n+r-1 (0) E T and 
(~ 3a) (O < pT +" a), (n = m + r). 
Let_ Q0 .... , Qr-1 be subsets of T such that a ~ Oi -* OPt[ z-1 a. 
Let Qj,  j <<. r be pairwlse disjoint sets such that 
~j  c_ {p~n(0) .... , p~n+r-l(9)}. Let q0 .... , qr-] be new successors and 
let L be a class " ' suca that b e L i f fb  is of the form qi(lr~+i(O)), 
O <<. i <~; r -  l, O <<. j <<. r - -1 .  
Define a <* b it'faPl b ol a E Q/A  b = pDn+J(~) or 
a = prO+r-1 (~)) ^  b = pton(O) 
or  
Define 
and a' <* 
Define 
Define 
a = p~n*i(0) A qj(a) ~ L ^ b = pr~t+/(O). 
aRb i f fa  <* b or for some O-j anda'  we have a '~ Q! ^aEQj  
b. 
S0(T, Qi, Qj ,  qi) as 
(Va, b ,d ) (aR 'b^aRnd-~b=d or b,d~Q~,  for some j). 
• (C l) "~- (Va, b) (a, b ~ Qi'  for some j ~ (a ~ C l *~ b ~ C l )). 
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1.emma 3.13. * (C  1 ) has the transfer property over R. 
Proof. By definition of  R. 
l.emma 3.14. Orn A -~ [:ln A holds in any tree structure fulfi l l ing (1) or (2). 
( n ( 1 ) ( ~ 3 a) 0 P ! a) and p 1 is used as accessibility rela tton. 
(2) (3a) (OOnl a) ^  T is o f  f i)rm (*), R is def ined as above, 
So(T,  0.i, Qi, qi) is required, and qt holds. 
We now turn to prove completeness. Let (S, R, O) be a structure, 
then we distinguish two cases. 
(1) (~3x) (OR n x)  in this case we pass in the usual manner to the ele- 
mentarily equivalent tree structure. In it, (>mA "~ rqnA holds in view 
of Lemma 3.14. 
(2) For some elements u1 ..... urn_ l , t 1 . . . . .  t r we have 
ORu I ^. . .A  Um_2 Rurn_l A Um_l Rt  I A tl R t2... tr_l R t  r ^ t rRt  I . 
Let T be the set of all increasing R-sequences (0, ..., xp) such that 
e i therp<m .... l o rm<p<m+r-1  and we have 
X 1 =Ul , . . . ,Xm_ 1 =llrn AX m -" t l ,  
Xm+ 1 = t 2 ^, . . . ,A  Xp = trn+p_ 1. 
In deEning the successor functions of the tree T, iet 
P0(0) = (0, ut), p0((0 ..... U,n)) = (0, ..., urn, tl),  ..., 
p0((0 .... , tr_x)) = (0,... ,  tv_ 1, tr). 
Let (0 ..... Xp) ~ Q! i f fp  = m - 1 and xp R ti+ l . Let qi ((0, ..., ti)) ~ L iff 
t i R t]+ 1" We now observe that we may have that t i = tj, i ¢ j. For this 
reason let Ql ,  Q2 ..... collect all "identical" elements from among 
(0 ..... ti), (0, ..., ti), t i = t i. 
Lemma 3.15. (0, ..., x)R(O .... y)  -~ xRy .  
Proof. By definition. 
I.emma 3.16. S0(T, Qi '  Q i '  qj) and ~I, hold. 
Proof. It is clear that # holds. We now prove $0. Assume 
(O , . . . , x )Rrn(o , . . . , y ) ,  (0, .... x)Rn(o , . . . ,u ) ,  
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we conclude therefore by Lemma 3.15 that u = y. Now since the only 
m+j elements at distance m from anything are of the form P0 ((0)), we 
have that both (0 ..... u) and (0, ..., y) of this form, so by definition of 
Q/'s, they are both in some Qi" (Observe that (0, ..., t / )R(O ..... x)  im- 
plies x = t i for some i )  
This concludes the c¢~mpleteness theorem. Now since all the above is 
expressible in our mopadic language, we get decidability. 
Theorem 3.17. The system H2K(m, 1, r, 1) (i.e., for  the choice o f  
parameters n = s = 1, see Chapter 2) is decidable. 
Proof. We outline the proof. The systen complete for the class of all 
models fulfilling N = S and the condition: 
F =(¥x) (3u ,  v ) (Vz ,z  ') [xRmu A xRr  O ADRg A uRz '~ Z =z' ] .  
Let (S, R, O, D) be a model fulfilling conditio.a F (N is omitted). Let 
o~, 3 be two functions uch that for each x, (a(x), {3(x~) is a pair (u, v) as 
promised by F, i.e., (¥z,z')  (o~(x) Rz  A {3(x) Rz '  ~ z = z'). 
Our aim is to associate with (S, R, O, D) another model 
(S 0, :~0, (0), D °) that is elementarily equivalent to it, of a kind that is 
directly expressible in SwS. Towards this end, we first construct he 
model (S*, R*, O*, D*) of Chapter 3, Definition 4 and transform it into 
(S °, R ° , (0), D°). 
We first define functions a*, 3 ~ such that the following holds: If 
a = (0, ..., x) and ~*(a) = (0, ..., u} and 3*(a) = (0, ..., v) then aR*ma*(a) 
and aR*r3*(a) and u = a(x)  and v = 3(x).  
Let S 1 be the following set: ((0)} u ((a, n) l a ~ S*, a 4= (0), n ~ co}, 
and define R 1 by (a ,n )R l (b ,n )  i f faR*b  and (O)R l (a ,n )  iff (0)R*a. 
Thus in (S 1 , R l, (0)) we have ~0 copies of each element a. It is easy to 
verify that if we define D 1 ((a, n), q) = D*(a,q)  we get an elementarily 
equivalent model. 
We can define functions aI , 31 on S l in such a way that the following 
holds. 
(a) If al((a,n)) = (b ,m)  then o~*(a) = b. 
(b) I f  31((a,n))  = (b ,m)  then 3*(a) = b. 
(c) I fR  l denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of R 1 then if 
y ,x  ~ S 1 and x R 1 y then the |bllowing holds: 
(VZ) [zR 1 u A zR  1 t/^ u E (or 1 (x), ~1 (x)) A 0 E (a I (y )~ l  (Y)} ~ ZRl  xl  
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We can arrange properties (a)-(c)  because in S I each point of S* has 
t~ o copies! 
We can now define the desired model (S °, R °, (0), Do). Let 
S O = S t - {x ~ S l I fay  ~ S 1 ) (~! (Y) ~ x ^ ~ ~ (.v) N lx )} .  
Then the followiag holds: 
(*) l f y  ~ S o and y is not of the form al(x),  then both oq(y), 
•t (Y) ~ S°. 
This follows frora (c) above. We can now define a °, #o on S O by: 
(1) a°(x) = a I (~), #°(x) = #1 (x), fo rx  such that (~3y)  (x = el(y)) .  
(2) For x = a I ( j )  let 
~°( x ) = ~l (#1 (Y)), : ° (x)  = ~l (#1 (Y)). 
Now let R ° be defined by xR°y  iff 
(a) xR t y and :c is not of the form al(o). 
(b) x = al(v) for sGme v and ~1 (v) RI y. 
Define D O = D 1 . In order to show that (S °, R °, (0), D °) is elementarily 
equivalent to (Si ,  R ! , (0),/5 I) we must verify the following: 
Lemma 3.18. ((0 ..... x), n)R°((O, ..., y), m) implies xR y. 
Proof. We leave this to the reader. 
The above construction shows that ou system is complete for models 
of the form (S °, R °, (0), Do). These models do fulfill condition F (be- 
cause ,~0, G0 yield the necessary elements). To obtain decidability all is 
left to do is to show that this new semantics i  expressible in S~S. Let 
(T, 01) be a tree as in Theorem 3.3 and let L be a parameter class asso- 
ciating with each a E T a pair of points of T (~(a), ~(a)) at distances 
(m, r) resp. from a. (See the way we .:lefined such an L in the case of 
Theorem 3.3.) We also require that (T, Pl) fulfills the property that if 
a ~ T and ~(a)p I x then x ~ T. 
We can define R using clauses (a) and (b) of the definition o fR  ° in 
terms of R l- With R replacing R ° in the definition and Pl replacing R1, 
and o~, ~ replacing oq, ~l. 
It is clear that this models fulfill condition F, ,and that every model 
with (S, R, O) is equivalent to a model of  this kind. 
Thus Theorem 3.17 is proved. 
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Chapter 5. Intermediate logics 
1. The intuitionistic tense system Jt 
We turn now to study various intuitionistic and in~,ermediate systems. 
Our first results is the decidability of an ~ntuitioristic tense syster ~ ! t. 
This system is obtained by adjoining to the intuitionistic propositional 
calculus the two tense operators GA and HA (GA reads: "A will always 
be true" and HA reads "A was always true"). The ~'eason we consider 
this system is mainly technical. The same completeness proof and proof 
of decidability works for the intuitionistic propositional calculus (= the 
fragment of Jt without G and H) and for intuitionistic modal K (= the 
fragment of Jt without H). The proof of decidability consists of  expres- 
slog the semantics of Jt directly in S~S. 
Let us begin by writing the axioms for Jt and then describing its 
semantics. 
The language o f J  t ccntaivs tile connectives ^, v, -~, G, H, f (f for 
falsity). ~ is defined by 
~A=A+f .  
Axiom schemas and rules for Jt" Axioms." 
(1 )A~ (B-~A). 
(2) (A ~ (B ~ C)) ~ ((A -~ B) ~ (A - C)). 
(3 )AAB->A;A  ^B ~ B. 
(4) (A --> B) --~ ((A ~ C) ~ (A -, B/ ,  C)). 
(5)A ->BvB;B--~ A vB. 
(6) (A ~ C) -+ ((B -~ (7) ~ (A vB ~ C)). 
(7) f-+A. 
(8) G(A ~B)  ~ (GA -~ GB). 
(9) H(A -~B) -* (HA ~ HB). 
(10)A vG ~ HA. 
( l l )  A vH'- ,  GA. 
Rules: 
i--~'!, I-A ~ B k-A 
k-B ' b-HA, ~-GA 
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Let us nc, w aescribe the se.mantics for which Jt is complete. The 
models have the forn, (T, <,  >,  <*, 1)) where T is a tree (actually a sub- 
set of ~o*) and <, >,  <* binary relations on T, D is the truth function 
for atomic predicates and the following holds. 
( l )  ~ T. 
(2) b ~ T and a~ i b for some 1 < i < 3 then a ~ T. 
(3) ~* is the reflexive and transitive closure of P3- 
(4) D(a,q)  = 1 and a <* b impl iesD(b,q)  = I. 
(5) We have a < b i f fb  > a. 
(6) Define a <'  b iff (3a o) (~b o) (a <* a 0 Pl bo ~<* b). 
~<:*" (7) Define a >'  b iff (3a o) (3b 0) (a <* a 0 P2 b0 ~ ~b). 
(8) Define a < b i f fa< 'borb>'a .  
(9) Define a > b i f fa  > 'b  orb  <'a. 
O~e can easily show that the following holds: 
( lO)a<b,~ b>a.  
( 11 ) If a <* a 0 < b o <* b thep a < b, and similarly for >.  
The truth value of a sentence A at a moment a (denoted IIA II a) is 
defined as follows: 
(12) For a propositional variable p, Ilpll a is the value given by D. 
(13) IIA ^ Bn a = I iff ~AII a = 1 and IIBII a = 1, 
t lAv BII a = 1 iff IIAII a = 1 or IIBII a = 1. 
(14) tlA-~BU a = 1 iff for all b such that a <* b, IIAII b = 0 or IIBIIt, = 1; 
II--A II a = 1 iff for all b such that a <* b IIa II b = 0, Ilfll a = 0 always. 
(15) IIGA II a = 1 iff for all b such that a < b, IIA II b = 1. 
(16) II HA II a = 1 iff for all b such that a > b, IIA tl b = 1. 
One may prove by induction that 
(17) IIAII a= 1 anda<*b imply l lA l l  b= 1. 
A holds in the model iff ItA II~ = 1. 
Theorem 1.1. (completeness for Jt)- Let ~p be a consistent set of wffs. 
Then ¢b has a model. 
Proof. (in outline). We proceed through ~he Yollowing list of definitions 
and lemma~. 
Definition 1.2. A theory A is said to be samrat~ed iff: 
(a) A v B ~ A implies A E A, or B ~ A; 
(b)A  ^ Be  A impliesA ~ A andB~ A; 
(c) A i--A implies A E A. 
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[x~mma 1.3. Let A, A be such that A is not provable in A, then A may 
be enlarged to a saturated theory A' such that A q~ A'. 
Proof. See Thomason [29]. Thomason proves this for intuitionistic 
logic, but Jt contains all the necessary axioms. 
Lemma 1.4. Let A be a saturated theory, let GA f~ A, and let 
A 0 = (B IGBE A) then A 0 btA. 
A 0 may therefore be enlarged to a seturated theory A A . A similar 
lemma holds for the case of  H, (in this case we denote the resulting 
theory by A8 ), i.e., with each A and,A we associate a new theory 
a(A, A) = A a ,  in the case of G and a(A ,A)  = A A in the case of H. 
Lemma 1.5. l f  A 1-/ A 1 -~ A2, then A U {A l} may be et;larged to a sant- 
rated theory A(A 1 -~A2)such that A(A l -~A 2) I~A 2 . 
Proof. See Thomason [29]. 
Let 00 be a consistent theory and let A be a sentence such that 
00 ~ A. We now construct a model of 0 o in which A is false. We enlarge 
00 to a saturated theory 0 such thatA q~ 0. LetA ~tA I  be a G6del 
numbering of all formulas of the language; we now construct an indexed 
set of saturated theories (denoted by 20 as follows" 
Stage O. Let (0, 0) E T O (0 is the empty sequence). 
Stage 3n + 1. For every (A, a) ~ T3, , and every A such that GA ~ A, 
let (A, a) ~ T3,~+ 1 and (A', b) ~ T3,÷ l , where A' = A A and 
b =a*  (31AI + 1). 
St,age 3n + 2. For every (A, a) ~ T3,+ l and every .4 such that HA ~ ,5, 
let (A, a) E T3n+2 and (A', b) ~ T3n+2, where A' = A A and 
b=a*  (3fAI + 2). 
Stage 3n + 3. For every (A, a) ~ T3,+ 2 and every A l '~ A2 such that 
A bLAi -* A 2 let (A, a) E T3n+3 and (A', b) E T3n.3 where 
A'= A(A 1 -->A2 ) and b =a*  (31A 1 -+A21). 
Take T = tJm~ w T m . Define: 
(a) (-5, a)p  3 (A', b) i f fb  = a * (3tAI) and A '= A(A); 
(b) (A, a) pl (A', b) iff b = a * (3 I A I + 1) and z~' = A A ; 
(c) (A., a) 02 (A', b) i f fb  = ,: * (31AI + 2) and z~' = A a , 
Now let u,.; define <*,  <, >,  in terms of p l ,  P2, P3 as we did above. 
Define: Ilpll(a.a ) = I i f fp ~ A for a propositional variable p. 
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l.emma 1.6. IAa(a,a ) = 1 iff A ~ A. 
Proof. By induction on A. See Thomason [29] and use our way of con- 
struction. The following is useful in the proof: 
(a) (A, a) <;* (A', b) implies A c_ A'. 
(b) (4,  a) < (A', b) and GA ~ A imply A (~ 4'.  
(c) (4, a) > (z~', b) and HA ~ A imply A ~ 4'. 
(d) By axioms ( I ! ), (12) show that if for every A, GA E A implies 
A ~ A' then for every A.. HA ~ 4' implies A E 4. 
This concludes the proof of  the completeness theorem. 
Theorem 1.7. Jt is decidable. 
Proof. The semantics i clearly expressible in $6oS. 
2. Minimal {modal) logic 
Our language contains the connectives ~, A, v, 4 ,  I3. The system 
HM13 has as rules of inference modus ponens and l- A --* b-13 A. The 
axioms are axioms ( 1 )-(7) of Jt together with axiom (9) (with G being 
replaced by 13). One can prove (see [ 14]) that HMt:3 is complete for the 
following semantics: Our structures are of the form (Q, T, Pl ,  P2,0, D) 
with 
Q~ TC_ w* ^ f~ET, 
a~- T^ (bp Iav  bp2a)-* b ~ T, 
aE Q ^  ap2b-* b~ Q, 
and tile property that for every propositional variable p, 
Ilplt a = 1 and ao2 b imply Ilpll b = 1. 
Let ~<* be the transitive and reflexive closure of OZ. Define a < b as 
follows: 
a < b iff (3e, d) (a <* ep 1 d <* b) .  
We de'fine satisfaction as follows: 
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(a) For the connectives ^, v, 4 :  [] the definition is as in the case of 
Jt, with [] replacing G. 
(b) For negation the definition is as follows: 
Ilfll a = 1 i f fa~ Q. 
This semantics i  expressible in our monadic language and therefore the 
analogue of Theorem 1.1 holds. 
Example 2.1. (a) If we require the condition 
F ( /3  = (Va, b e T) (a <* b -'- a = b) 
we get semantics for the modal logic based on the system HE (classical 
refutability of Curr3' [4]). 
(b) If we require further that Q is empty we get the modal logic K of 
Lemmon-Scott .  This is true since A v --- A would hold and thus we get 
axiomatic K. 
(c) If we require only that (Va~ T)(Q c {bla <* b A b ~: a}) we get 
the modal system based on HD of Curry [4]. 
3. The minimal legic and e~:tensions 
It was proved by Segerberg [27-] and independently by the author [5 ], 
that the minimal logic HM is complete for the following semantics: 
Our structures are of the form (Q, T, <, 0, D) where 0 ~ T, Q c_ T and 
< is a reflexive and transitive closure of a tree relation Pl on T. The fol- 
lowing holds: 
(a) (va ~/3  (5 < a) A (Va, b) (a < b A b ~ T-~ a e/3. 
(b)a~Q Aa<b-~ b~Q. 
(c) Ilpli a = 1 ^ a<<.b-* [Ipll b = 1. 
Satisfaction is defined as follows: 
IIAABtl a= 1 iff 
IIA vBII a= 1 iff 
IIA -~BII a = 1 i f f  
!lflt a = 1 iff 
IIAII a = 1, ItBII a = 1 
IIAII a = 1, tlBff a = 1 
(¥b)(a<bA IIAII b = 1 ~ !lBti b = 1) 
aEQ.  
Lemma 3.1. IIAII a = 1Aa<b~ IIAIIt, = 1. 
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ProoL By induction. 
Example 3.2. (a) For Q empty our semantics i  that of  the intuitionistic 
logic HJ. 
(b) For Q D T - (0} we get semantics for HD = HM + A v ~A. There- 
fore we conclude that the decidability theorems hoid for the above 
logics as well. 
Theorem 3.3. Dummett's system KC (KC = HJ + ~A v ~~A) is decidable. 
Proof. One can verify that KC has tra~asfer property (the above schema) 
over HJ, and since Theorem 16, Chapter 3, h~lds for HJ we get that it is 
decidable. 
Theorem 3.4. The fgllowing extensions of HM a,e decidable. 
(a) f - * (A ~*B)v(B-~A). 
(b) f~A v(A ~B) .  
Proof. (a) is decidable since its semantics is expressible in our monadic 
language. We take the formula F(T, Q) to be (Va ~ Q) (vb, r E T)(a < b 
A a < r --* b < r v r < b). To prove that (a) is complete for this semantics, 
we transform any model of (a) into an elementarily equivalent structure 
fulfilling F(T, Q). This may be done as follows: 
Let a E Q, define (for b, r above a), b = r iff for all A, IIA I1 b = tlA II r, 
then there exists a certain prescribed order in which every path in the 
tree through a meets the equivalence classes. We can use this fact to 
transform our structure to the desired form. 
(b) is decidable since it has the transfer property. 
Theorem 3.5. The following extensions of HM are decidable. 
(1)A v ~A; 
(2) (A ~ (B v t)) v (B -* (A v f)); 
(3) f v ( I - *A) ;  
(4) "--A v ~~A.  
ProoL (1) This is HD. 
(2) This axiom says that T is linear below Q. 
(3) This axiom says that Q = T or Q is empty. 
To prove completeness we proceed as follows: Let M be a model of 
(3) with tree T and Q c_ T. I f  Q = T, we are finished. Otherwise we drop 
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every a ~ Q, and get a tree T' .  It is now easy to prove, by induct ion,  the 
following. 
Lem~na 3.6. UA II a in T' = ~A II a in 7'. 
(4) A:ly structure which is a model o f (4 )  has the property:  
(#) For  every A, either(qaq~Q)(~A~ a = O) 
or (vaq~Q)(3bgQ)(a<b^ ~AII b = 1). 
Let T '  = 7" u { 1 } (1 being a new point) and let Q' = Q. Define 1 < a for 
a ~ Q and ~r < 1 fo ra  q~ Q. Let  Ilpll I = 0 i f (Va  q~ Q) (Hp~ a = g), for any 
propositior~al variable p. The  axiom assures us that this is a proper  defi- 
nit ion o f  a structure. Using (#) we get: 
Lemma 3.7. IIA tl I = 0 in T' i f f (Va q~ O) (llA II o = 0). 
Proof.  The ca:~es o f  A, V present no difficulties. Assume IIA ~ Bli I = 0, 
then at no a ~< 1 do we have II A ~ B II a = 1, since this implies 
IIA ~ B II 1 = !. ~ssume (¥a  q~ Q) ( !l A -~ B t~ a = 0) we want to prove 
IIA -~ B 111 = 0. We cannot have lib II a = 1 for a q~ Q since then 
UA --> BII a = 1, therefore by indt~ction hypothesis  IIBII 1 = 0. Now let 
a ~ Q, then we have IIA -~Bti a = 0, so for some b,a ~ b, ~A lit, = 1, 
IIBII b = 0. I fb  ~ Q, we are finished, l fb  q~ Q -~hen by induction hypothe-  
sis, IIAII 1 = 1 and since IIBII 1 = 0, we get IIa -÷BII 1 = 0 and we are 
finished. 
Lemma 3.8. For a ~- T we have IIA I1 a. in T' = IIA II a in T. 
Proof. Use induct ior  and Lemma 3.7. 
HM + (4) is decidable since we can express this semantics in our  
monadic language. 
Remark 3.9. Every. union of  logics from among those of  the preceding 
two theorems is decidable.* 
lheorems 3.4 and 3.5 il lustrate the power  of  our methods,  we give 
another example: 
4 These unions are mentioned in St'gerberg [27]. Se~erbet~,, alto managed to prove decidability 
by his methods. 
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Theorem 3.10. The transfer property holds for Dummett 's  
LC = HJ + (A --> B) v (B -~ A) over HJ. 
Proof. The transfer property depends on the particular axiomatization 
we give our system. If we extend the intuitionistic logic with (A ~ B) v 
v(B ~ A), then transfer property does not hold. We therefore take the 
following axiom schemas: 
"-.A v "--~A, (A --, B) v (B ~ A). 
To prove tra~.sfer show that if A, B fulfill the first axiom then A ~ B is 
either "truth" or equivalent to A. 
Remark 3. I 1. The above method shows that similar theorems hold eor 
the implicational and other fragments of HM and its extensions. 
Remark 3.12. If we base Jt on classical ogic, i.e., look at 
Kt = Jt + A v ~A, we get Lemmon's tense system K t. This system !s 
decidable as its semantics is like that o f J  t with condit iona <*b -+ a = b. 
Simihrly linear time tense logics and rational time tense logics are 
decidable. 
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Chapter 6. Intuitionistic predicate theories 
In this chapter we consider the decision problem for several theories 
of linear order and unary functions formulated in Heyting's p:edi,:ate 
calculus (HPC). 
1. Linear order 
We showed in [ 10] that the intuitionistic theory o~ r decidable total 
linear ordering is undecidablc. The axioms are: 
(1) --,(x < x). 
(2)X < y A y<z-*  x<z .  
(3) (x < y) v ~(x < v). 
(4) x ~< y vy~x.  
(5) x =y  vx=~v. 
(6) Axioms for equality. 
Our aim in this chapter is to show that if we supplement the theory 
above with the axiom schema 
(7) (Vy < u) [A(y) v B] ~ [(Vy ~< u)A(y) v B],y is not free in B, 3,4: u, 
wc [~et a decidable theory L. We remark that if we add the axiom schema 
(8) (Vy)(A(y) vB) ~ (Vy)(A()') vB), y not free in B, 
we obtain the theory of linear order L as lormulated in classical logic 
(i.e., L + (8) = classical theory of linear order). This is so becaust (8) is 
the axiom schema for the logic CD of constant domains, see [ 12 ]. 
The proof of the decidability of L consists of two parts: Theorem 1,1, 
giving the completeness of L t\~r a convenient class M of Kripke struc- 
tures, and Theorem 1.2, showing that the semantics of M is expressible 
in SwS. 
Theorem 1.1. L is complete for the class M of  all Kripke structures of  
HPC of  the form (T, Pl , ~, Ut <t) ~vhere: 
(a) TC_{x~ w*lOolx}; 
(b)y E T^ x~l y-~ xE  T; 
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(c) (U t, <t), t E T is a totally linearly ordered countable set; 
(d) For ;O1 s, the model (U s, <s) is an end extension of (Ut, <r). 
(That is, (U t, <t) is a submodel of (U s, <s) with 
a E Ut ^ b e Us - Ut -* a <s b.) 
Theorem 1.1 shall be proved later on. 
Theorem 1.2. The semantics M for L as described above is expressible in 
S~S.  
Proof. Actually this is simple. Define: 
L 0 =U 0. 
Let tO] s be true, then 
Ls = U~-  U ,. 
Clearly for t E T, L t is linearly ordered by <t.  Being a countable liv~arly 
ordered set, L t can be identified with a subset L t c_ (x ~ t l tp~ x} and 
<t can be identified with -4 [ L t. Thus U s can be identified with 
U s -- Ot~ls L t and since we have property (d) of the model, <t can be 
defined in S¢oS by <~t as: 
a ~<t b iff (Bs, S'~I t) [(a E L s ^  b E L s, ^  s p] s') 
v (s = s' and a -~ b)]. 
L s can be obtained by a set variable L of ScoS having the property 
that L n {xl0p~ x} ~ 0 and L s is simply L n {xlsp~ x) .  
Now given a formula A of the theory L, it is easy to translate A into a 
formula A* of S~0S that says "A is true in all models". We do this as fol- 
lows: First we define a formula A#(t)  of $6oS with a free variable t that 
says essentially that A is true at the world t, (i.e., IIA II t = 1). This is done 
by induction. Remember that A # depends also on the parameters T (of  
the model) and L (used to get L t and lit). 
(a) (x < y)# = x ~t  Y 
(For convenience elements variables of L and element variables of SwS 
are denoted by the same letters.) 
(b) (x = y)# = (x = y). 
(.4 ^  B) # = A # ^  B # 
(A v B) # = A # v B # 
( f )#  = (t 4= t) 
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(A ~ B) # = (Vs ~ T) ( t~l  s ^  A#(s)  -~ B#(s))  
[(3x) (A(x))l # = (3x ~ Vt) A#(x) 
(Vx) (A(x) )  # = (¥s) (¥x) ( t#l  s ^ s ~ T ^ x ~ V~ -~ A#(s ,x ) ) .  
A* is defined asA* = (Vt) (VL) (if T is as in (a), (b) of Theorem !. ! 
and L0 ~ 0 then A#(~))). We thus conclude that L is decidable. 
Let us now turn to the proof  of Theorem 1.1. This involves a .~eries of 
definitions and lemmas. To make our proof usable in different p,~sible 
situations, we employ some special definitions: 
If V is a set of variables, we say that A is in the language of V if all 
the free variables of A are from V. In the course of future constructions 
we shall use sets of variables, U0, U~, U2, ..., all being pairwise disjoint 
sets of cardinal ~0- So from now on when we refer to a language we also 
mean that the language has a certain fixed set of variables. 
Definition 1.3. (a) If L is our system, then by an L-theory we mean 
pair (A, 0) of sets of formulas. 
(b) (A, 0) is said to be L-consistent iff for no A i 6,5 ,  Bj c 0, do w~ 
have L bAA i -, VB,. 
(c) (A, 0) is said tc be complete (in a certain language) iff for all ~f f  
A of this language, either A E A or A E 0. 
(d) A theory (~, 0) is said to be saturated, in a certain language ill" for 
is complete and consistent and: 
(1 )AvB~ A impl iesA~AorB~A.  
(2) A I--A implies A ~ A. 
(3) (3x)  (A(x) )  E A in, plies that for some variable u of the language, 
A(u)  E ~. 
(e) (N,  0') is sakJ to extend (~, 0) iff ,2, c_ ~', 0 c_ 0'. 
(D Let t = (z~, 0) be a saturated theory in a language with variables U. 
Since < is a decidable ordering in L, <t orders U linearly, where x <t Y 
i f fx<yE A. 
(g) Let U c U' and let < order U' linearly. Let V c_ U' we write 
U~ Vtomean(Vx) (¥3 , ) (x~UAy~ V-*x<y) .Wewr i teU~< Vto  
mean (Vx) (3y) (x ~ U -* y ~ V ,, x ~< y). 
(h) Define the quantifier (vax) (A(x) )  to mean (Vx) (x ~ a -* A (x ) )  
(we use a, x different letters). 
(i) Let t = (2~, 0) be a saturated theory in a language with variables U. 
Let s = (A '  0') be a saturated theory in a language with variables U' =~ U. 
We say that s is an end extension of t, (t ~< s) iff z~ c A', and in the order- 
ing< s of U' we have U~¢ (U ' -  U). 
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0) We 
(1) 
(2) 
shall use the following abbreviations. 
If A is in a language with variables U, we shall say that A is in 
a language U. 
I f  U o c_ U and A o is the set o f  all wffs A such that A is in the 
language U o and A ~ A, we shall simply write A o --: A n U 0. 
We can now proceed with some useful lemmas. 
Lemma 1.4. Let  t o = (A o , 0 o) be a ~'aturated theorv in a language U o. 
Let  t~ = (A] ,  0~) be a saturated theory in the language U~I Assume that 
A o c_ A,.  Then t o can be extended to a saturated theory t in ~,, language 
U and t* I can be extended to a saturated theory t* in a language U* ~_ U 
such that t* is an end extensi~m Gf t. 
Proof. Let U~ = U l tO V l with the property that U 1 ~t~ U0 and 
Uo %; Vl. 
Clain. 1. (A o , 0 o u O* 1 n U 1 ) is a consistent heory of' the language U o u V 1 
Proof. Otherwise for some A o ~ A o, B o ~ 0 o, B~ ~ 0] n U l we get: 
I-- A o --" B o v B].  Let x i be the variables of  U 1 that appears free in B~. 
Since U 1 <, ,  U o, there exists a i E U 0 such that x i <<. a i E A* 1 . We can 
L |  • 
therefore continue: 
. , .a i . . ,  t -A o ~ (V...xi...) (B o 9 B~) 
x i v~ a i 
. . . a  i , . .  
~- A 0 -~ B 0 v (V...xi... ) (B] ) . 
This sentence is in the language U o. 
• "ai  fi"4" _ * Since A o ~ A o , B o 6 0 o , we get (Vl..xi) ~"1 ~ A0 ,z A 1 ), a contradic- 
tion to the consistency of  (A~, 0~ ). 
Now since (A o , 0 o tO 0~ n U t ) is consistent, it can be exten0ed ~:o a 
theory t ,  = (A 2 , 02), saturated in the language U 2 _3 U o tO U 1" 
Claim 2. The theory (A] u A2,0] ) iS consistent in the language U 2 to U~. 
Proof  Otherwise for some A] ~ A 1 , A z ~ A 2, B 1 ~ 01 we have 
]---A 2 ~ (A~ ~B] ) .  
Le tx i  be the variables inA 2 from U 2 - (U  o u U 1 ) and le ty j  be the 
variables from V 1 that appear in A] ~ B] .  Then 
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P ( xi) (A 2) " (vz j )  (A ] -,. B]). 
This wff is in the language of U 0 u U 1 and since (3x i) (A 2 ~- A2), we get 
(Vy) (A~ ~B] )  ~ ZX 2 . On the other hand, since A] ~ A], B] ~ 0], 
(Vy])(AI Bl )6OlnU l ,andthere fere(Vy l ) (A  l - *B l )~02,acont ra -  
diction. 
Now since the theory of  Claim 2 is consistent, extend it to a sai:t'.rated 
theory t3 = (A~, 0]) in a languaze Uj _~ U~ u b' 2 . We can write 
U~ = U 3 0 V3, with U 3 ~<t; U and U 2 ,¢.. V 3. 
We can now continue, as we are in the s~matmn of Claim 1 and con- 
struct the extension t 4 of t 2 and then using the situation of Claim 2 
again, construct t~ etc. 
We can thus assume that we constructed the sequences of theories 
t2, and t~n+l with the properties: 
(1) t2, ~ = (A2n, Ozn) is in the language U2n. 
(2) t~n+ 1 = (A2n+l, 02n+ l) is in the language L2n+l = U2n+ l U V2,)+ 1 . 
(3) (a) t2n+ 2 extends t2n, U2n c U2,+2. 
(b) * * * c_ * t2n+3 extends t2n+l, U2n+l U2n+3, 
(4) (a) U2n+l <t~n+, U2n" 
(b) U2n+l <~.* V2n. /.p~ 2n + 1 
(e) U2n C_ "'2n+l, U2n+I C U2n+2. 
(5) A2n C A~n+l,O~n+l ~ U2n+ 1 C 02n+2. 
We claim that 
t = (UIAzn, O02n), t* = ([.JA2n+l, O02n+!) 
fulfill the properties of Lemma 1.4. 
To show that t* is an end extension of t, let x ~ tJ U~n+l -. O U2n. 
Then by (4c), x qt O UZn+l. Let y ~ Uzn, then since x ~ V2n_t we get 
Y <t* x. 
Lemma 1.5. Let t] = (&], 0~ ) t  2 r:. (A2,02) be two saturated :heories 
such that O] n U c_ 02, where U is the common language o f  these two 
theories and A 2 n U C_ Al ,  then t 1 can be extended to a t* and t 2 to a t 
such that t* is an end extension o f  t. 
Proof. Follows from the process given in the proof of Lemma 1.4, espe- 
cially beginning with Claim 2. 
Lemma 1.6. Let T c_ (x l 0 ~ 1 x}. Let ~ be a function associating with 
each x E T a theory o f  linear order a(x) = (A x , 0 x ) saturated in a 
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(denumberable) language U x. Assume that x ~, 1 y implies A x c_ Ay, 
U x c_ Uy. Then there exists a fimction [3, associating with each x ~ T a 
theory (A x, 0 x) with properties as above and the additional properties 
that: 
(a) 3(x) is an extension o f  a(x); 
(b) x]~ l y i,nplies {3(y) is an end extension of  3(x); 
(c) all languages involved are countable. 
Proof. Assume T, a are given. Let f be a function from co into T such 
that f (0)  ¢ 0 and each element of  T is obtained ~0 times, and 0 is al- 
ways the highest element in T below f (n),  f (n  + 1); for any n. We shall 
define a sequence of  functions [3m,,,, m, n ~ co, such that [3m,n(X), for 
x ~ T is a saturated theory. The required 13 shall be the limit of these 
( x ). 
Stage 0,0. Let 30,0 = a. 
Stage 0,1. If f (0)  = x ¢ 9, let 0 ~= Y0, .-., Y,~ = x be the sequence (Ol 
sequence) of T leading to x. Look at the pair a(yn_ 1 ), a(k'n). This pair 
fulfills the conditions of  Lemma 1.4, and therefore there exists exten- 
sions in a richer language, with properties as in Lemma 1.4. Call these 
theories 30, l (Yn), 30, l (Yn-l)- Now look at a (Yn-2), 30,1 0'n_l). This pair 
again fulfills the conditions of  Lemma 1.4. Let {3o,2(yn_z), 30,2(Yn-1) 
give this pair. Define also 30,2 (Yn) = 30,1 (Yn)" Continue in this manner 
until you reach 0 = Y0, and at that stage {3o,,,(0), ..., ~O,n(Yn) are defined. 
Each time we extend our theories according to Lemma 1.4, we use com- 
pletely new variables. We also know from the construction that ~O,n(Yi) = 
~O,m(Yi ) i fm >t i+ 1. 
No,v we observe that ~0,n(0) and 3o, n(Yl) fulfill the conditions of 
Lemma 1.5. Let therefore 3o, n+1(0),/70,n+l(Yl) be two extensions, i~~ a 
richer language fulfilling the conditions promised in Lemma 1.5. Let 
~o,n+l(Yi) = ~O,n(Yi) for i > 1. Now/30,n+l(Yl) , ~0,n+I(Y2) fulfill the as- 
sumption of Lemma 1.5. Therefore there exist extensions 30,n+2(Yl), 
3o, n÷2 (Y2) lhlfilling the properties promised by Lemma 1.5. Let 
~0, n+2(0) = fl0,n+l (0), ~O,n+2(Yi) = ~0, w'- 1 (Yi), for i > 3. 
We can thus go on until we reach Yn ~: x and then start going back 
again etc. 
Let 31,0 be defined by: 
In(z), for z ~- (Yo, "', Yn) , 
/3L°(z) = [ (U n A~o,n(z ), U n O~o,n(z))," otherwise. 
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It is easy to see that {3t,o() i) is an end extension of/3t,o(y l_ 1). 
Stage m. Suppose f3m, o is given. Assume f (m)  = x. Let Yo ..... .v n be 
as before. Notice that since in the process of construction, whenever we 
extended a theory, we used completely new variables, then if 0,o I v, 
then the con:lition of Lemma 1,5 hold for ~,n,0(0), f3m,0(oL We can then 
again run up and down 0, Yl .... , Yn.~t, x and define Ore*l,0" 
Now define ~ by 
¢~(x) = (U,, zaa,,,o(~), U, 0~,,,o(x)). 
It is easy to verify that ¢3 has the required propecqes. 
We can now turn to the 
Proof. of Theorem 1.1. Let (A, 0) be a consistent theory of L. We shall 
construct a tree model of (A, 0) with all the required properties. 
Recall the way a model of (A, 0) is constructed in [29]. Two lcmmas 
are needed. 
Lemma 1.7. Let (A', 0') be a saturated theory in a language U, Let 
F = A -~ B ~ 0'. Then there exists a saturated theory (A' F , 0~.) in a lan- 
guage with possibly more variables V such that 
t 
A'  U {A} ~ A F , 
a eo'e 
Lemma 1.8. Simi!arly, i f  F = (Vx) (A(x) ~ 0'), then there exists 
(A~F), O[F)) such that A' c A~F ) and for some x o f  the language of  
(A~F), O~F )) we ilave A(x) ~ O' F. As belore, we have that (AIF), OIF )) is a 
theory in a possibly richer language. 
Now construct a model for (A, 0). let S be a set of satur,lted theories 
such that 
(1) (A,0) ~ S. 
(2) If (A', 0') ~ S and F = A -* B (or F = (Vx) (A(x))) is in 0' then a 
theory (A~, 0~) (or A~F ), O~F )) is in S. 
Defining R on S as c (i.e., (A 1 , 01 ) R (A 2 , 0 2) iff A l c_ A2) and letting 
IIP(x t ..... xn)llOx, o, ) = 1 i f fP(x I ..... x n) E A', for P atomic, we obtain a 
model of (A, 0); as we can show that, for any .4, 
IIAIl(z~,,o, ) = 1 iff A E A'. 
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Although (S, R) is not a tree, we can always arrange for an S to be s.t., 
S = T~ (x l0~l  x}, and for a function a, s.t. t~(x), x ~ S is a saturated 
tb.eory (A,,¢x), Oa¢x)) and the required properties hold for R = 01 and 
x~ l y-~ A~x) c A~¢O and ~he model is obtained froln the theories by 
H.t~ x = 1 iffA ~ Aatx). 
So from now on when we speak about Henkin type model, we mean 
something like the above. 
Following Thomascn [29], let T l be a Henkin model o f (A ,  0). We 
have no assurance that this model has the required properties. Let a t be 
the function giving the respective Henkin type saturated theories 
(A,l(x), 0,, (x)) associated with eacil x ~ T 1 . 
Let/3 i be a function promised in Lemma 1.6, with the properties of 
Lemma 1.6. Since the theories given by 31 are in a richer language, we 
have no assurance that T l , 31 is z good model, that is we may have a 
theory (~o~x), 0a tx)) with A ~" B ~ Oa~(x ) but for no y such that x~ 1 y 
can wc have A ~ ~ O,), B E 00~t:~,. This may hapl~en because A -~ B 
may be in the new language. However there is no obstacle in following 
Thomason's process (or Lemmas 1.7-1.8 of the completeness proof) and 
taki,a~ T 2 ~ T l , ot 2 ~ ~1 sucl~that T2 , a 2 is a proper model. But now it 
is not clear that this mc.lel has the end extension property required by 
the semantics of Theorem 1.1. Of  course we know that the property 
holds for az(X), a2(y),  x, y ~ T 1 , but it may fail for T 2 . However, we 
can always define 32 as in Lemma 1.6. We can go on getting a 3 , T 3 , 33, 
Ot 4 , . . . .  
Now let T = O n T,, ; for x ~ T, let a(x) = lim % (x) where lira o~ n(x) = 
( A x , 0 x )  with A x = I.Ji~ m Ac~i(x), 0 x = [Ji>~rn O~i(x), and x ~ T m . 
One can verify that this is a Henkin type model of (A, 0) fulfilling the 
requirements of Theorem 1.1. It is important o remember that when- 
ever we use additional variables, in any of the processes, we always use 
completely new ones. 
2. One unary function 
In Theorem 4.4, Chapter 1, x~e stated that the intuitionistic theory of 
one unary function with decidable quality is not decidable. We also 
stated that the extension of this theory with the axiom that every ele- 
ment has exactly m (m fixed) predecessors is decidable. We now show: 
294 D.M. Gabbay / Decidability results in non-clasxtcal logics 
Theorem 2.1. The extension o f  the intuitionistic theory o f  one unary 
function and decidable quality with all the schemes (*)n below is 
aecidable, 
( ,~  (¥~,n) (A(x)  v B) ~ (V~ 'n) (A(x) v B), x nor free in B; 
whe;.'e (¥ax'n) (A(x)) is (Vx) [V0<m <.,, f in(x)  = a --, A(x)]. 
The decidability of this theory follows from Theorem 2.2, that gives 
semantics expressible in S~S. 
Theorem 2.2. The theory o f  Theorem 2.1 is complete for the cla:.s o f  a!l 
Kripke models o f  the fi~rm (T, ~ 1, O, Ut, f t )  such that: 
(a) (0~ T) ^ (so T^ t,~lS~ t~ T); 
(b) (U t , j~.) is a m~,del o f  unary function; 
(c) l f  x ~ U t and t at s and y ~ Us - Ut then not fn  (y) = x, for any 
natural number n; 
(d) I f  tO l s, then (b t , f  t) is a submodel o f (Us ,L ) .  
We can now obtain decidability by exprc;sing this semantics in S~S. 
We know from Rabin [26] that first order models of unary ftmctions 
are expressible in Sc~S. Conditions (c) and (d) say that for t,91 s, 
(U s - U t , f )  is a model of f which is not at all connected wita (Ut , f ) .  
So we have a case here that is just like the case of end exteqsions of 
Theorem 1.1. So let L s = U s - U t, L¢ = U¢ and express in So.~S the 
model (L s, fsl Ls) as a subset of L s c_ ~xl so~ x }. 
The rest can be done i~ a similar way to the case of linear order. 
To prove completeness for this semantics, let x < y mean f (x )  = y. If 
Uc_ U' are two universes of/] let U '< Umean (Vx~ U ' ) (3y~ U) 
[(.X" <ny) ,  for some n]. If V ~ U', let U< V mean 
(Vn) (Vx ~ U) (Vy E I1) (~(y ~" x)). 
Using these concepts and the. quantifiers a,n (¥x) which were defined 
for the case of unary function, the completeness proof of Theorem I. 1 
goes through for our case. 
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